"The Many Faces of China's Repression: Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and U.S. Diplomacy in China"


"The Many Faces of China's Repression: Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and U.S. Diplomacy in China"

U.S. Commission On International Religious Freedom

Testimony Presented by Sharon Hom
Executive Director, Human Rights in China


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Human Rights in China (HRIC) thanks the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom for this opportunity to address religious freedom concerns in China. The question of how to get greater traction from U.S. engagement with China on human rights has never been more urgent and timely. In the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics and the 17th Communist Party Congress, U.S. policymakers have an opportunity to develop more effective approaches for leveraging and monitoring these two key international and domestic events. We respectfully submit this testimony to provide input and suggestions as the Commission considers its recommendations to the new Congress on these issues. In the limited time allotted, I would like to make three key points:

  • INFORMATION: In order to develop an accurate assessment of the human rights situation in China, we need to understand what we know and what we don't know (and why).

  • FRAMEWORK: Efforts to promote greater religious freedom must be contextualized within a broader framework that includes the overall context of ongoing human rights violations and crackdowns.

  • STRATEGY: Access points for engaging China must include strategic analysis of not only tangible "bargaining chips" (trade, security arrangements), but intangibles, most notably, China's desire to be a respected member of the international community.


INFORMATION: What we know and what we don't know (and why)

At every level, there are limits on the ability of the international community to fully monitor or understand the full situation of human rights violations in China due to censorship, information control, and the lack of transparency and accountability.

As reported by NGOs, including HRIC, and U.S. government reports, the right to freedom of expression is seriously constrained in China through the overarching state secrets system, supported by broader police and social controls, as well as sophisticated technology censorship and surveillance tools.[1] HRIC and other groups have also documented an increasing crackdown against lawyers, journalists, Internet activists and other human rights defenders as a means of controlling dissent, expression of cultural, religious, or ethnic identity, or efforts to expose and investigate endemic corruption, and other social problems.

Numerous missions to China have also been conducted by governments, including this Commission, UN bodies and mechanisms, independent monitors; yet these missions were constrained by limited access and official surveillance. Manfred Nowak, the Special Rapporteur on Torture, stated after his China visit in 2005:
"The Special Rapporteur feels compelled to point out that some Government authorities, particularly the Ministries of State Security and Public Security, attempted at various times throughout the visit to obstruct or restrict his attempts at fact-finding. The Special Rapporteur and his team were frequently under surveillance by intelligence personnel, both in their Beijing hotel as well as in its vicinity. Furthermore, during the visit a number of alleged victims and family members were intimidated by security personnel, placed under police surveillance, instructed not to meet the Special Rapporteur, or were physically prevented from meeting with him."[2] (emphasis added)

However, even within this universe of limited information, there is general consensus that the official line is hardening in the face of growing domestic social unrest and instability:

The Tiananmen "bargain": "Don't ask, get rich"—is falling apart as the hundreds of millions are left behind—the rural poor, migrants, ethnic groups, other vulnerable groups—finding themselves without access to affordable healthcare, education, and housing. The causes of the increase in protests range from illegal land grabs, local corruption, the closure of state-owned factories, to the industrial pollution of farmland. In particular, some of the most high-profile incidents of unrest have resulted from land seizures by corrupt local officials, who have failed to give adequate compensation to villagers.[3]

In response to these challenges to the regime's legitimacy, the government is intensifying crackdowns and repression, even as it now tries to wrap itself in a new popularism and rhetoric of concern about the growing social inequality. In the current global security context, China has also used the U.S.-led 'war on terror' to invoke politically-charged labels, to justify its harsh treatment of ethnic groups who advocate greater rights, protection, and genuine autonomy.[4]


FRAMEWORK: Religious repression must be addressed within the broader context of human rights violations, crackdowns, and lack of an independent and transparent rule of law

Despite protections in domestic Chinese law[5] and China's international human rights obligations, the situation continues to worsen for all religious practitioners or groups not sanctioned by the state. The current wave of control and repression against religious groups must be seen within the greater context of human rights violations, including those against ethnic minorities, human rights defenders, activists and ordinary petitioners.

Specific steps taken by the authorities, including increasing media restrictions,[6] and limiting the ability of people to petition and organize,[7] clearly demonstrate that maintaining Party's political monopoly remains a key imperative. Furthermore, the Guiding Opinion on Lawyers Handling Collective Cases, passed in 2006, states that lawyers taking on "collective" cases— i.e. cases involving more than ten people—and "major sensitive cases" are required to immediately report to and accept the supervision and guidance of judicial administrative organs.[8]

These restrictive measures affect freedom of expression, association, and the right to petition the government—rights violated under the religious repression in China, as well as by crack-downs on all rights defenders.

In the first month of 2007, HRIC reported on several human rights cases, including:
  • Guo Feixiong, a human rights lawyer, was detained and beaten on a number of occasions in 2005 and 2006 before he was formally arrested. His case has now been delayed as a result of "insufficient evidence."[9]

  • Mao Hengfeng, a family planning activist, has been sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison on a charge of "intentionally destroying property." Mao, who has petitioned the authorities since 1988 on family planning and housing issues, has been detained many times in the past, and has been sentenced to various terms of Reeducation-Through-Labor (RTL). She has also on several occasions been forcibly admitted for psychiatric treatment. Mao has reported torture and other abusive treatment during her previous terms of detention and psychiatric treatment.[10]

  • Sun Xiaodi, an environmental activist, is facing serious harassment by local officials and unknown persons, and has been unable to obtain official permission to seek medical treatment in Beijing for a potentially life-threatening health condition, after receiving an international award for his activism. Sun has spent more than a decade petitioning the central authorities over radioactive contamination from the No. 792 Uranium Mine in the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu Province.[11]

"Rule by law," not rule of law

Within a framework that maintains the supremacy of the Party, the PRC has aimed to build its legal system and "a rule of law" that promotes its economic reform policies. China's approach to rule of law is in fact a rule by law, and reflects a disturbing "Trojan Horse" problem. Under the banner of regulation, or legislative reforms, the authorities are in fact often using law to maintain social and political control. The recent media measures[12] or the regulations on anti-money laundering[13] are good examples of this kind of invocation of legitimate regulatory purposes, but that have the intended consequence of information control and chilling impact on contacts between domestic and overseas groups.

China's legal system lacks an independent judiciary, and is marked by politicized decision-making especially in sensitive cases, where the defense lawyers themselves are under attack, and where there is massive corruption throughout the system. In such a system, there are no checks and balances, transparency, or accountability to ensure that the legal system is functioning fairly and protecting the interests of all people and society, rather than the interests of the ruling elite.


STRATEGY: Suggestions for developing access points

Access points for engaging China must include strategic analysis of not only tangible "bargaining chips", but intangibles, most notably, China's desire to be a respected member of the international community.

A smooth and successful Olympics is paramount to the Chinese government. In addition to construction of venues and state of the arts security systems, China's Olympics preparations also include a number of campaigns aimed at "packaging" China, and to change public behavior, including promoting "a new code of conduct" (no spitting, no slurping of soup, no littering, standing in line, and teaching residents to speak English). The Games are expected to draw 800,000 foreign visitors and one million domestic visitors to Beijing.

This official re-packaging of China requires a difficult balancing act, between responding to international pressure for greater openness and loosening of restrictions (as evidenced by the new foreign media regulations), managing its public relations for the Olympics, and its key imperative to maintain Party control. In the crevices of that political balancing act, the U.S. government can explore new points of leverage and access/intervention.

Keeping in mind the potential backlash of Chinese nationalism, "tangible" and "intangible" levers can be explored in the final lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, including: engagement with the corporate and legal sectors, targeting those that are Olympics sponsors,[14] service providers,[15] and security technology providers.[16]

The following recommendations are targeted towards the PRC government, but the U.S. government can play an important role in promoting these legislative and structural reforms through high level dialogues, technical assistance and exchange programs, and other interactions with the PRC government.

  • Delivering on promises to the international community: The PRC should issue a progress report on its preparations for the 2008 Olympics, including assessment of compliance with its host obligations and promises made regarding a "green" Olympics, the improvement of social welfare, and greater access to the Internet.

  • Promoting greater transparency and access to information: The state secrets legal and regulatory framework must be reviewed to ensure that policy-makers and civil society have adequate and reliable information. The lack of this information hinders understanding and analysis of the problems, and the development of effective and appropriate solutions.[17]

  • Freedom of religion and facilitating the preservation of cultural identity:

    • In accordance with international standards and PRC law that protects the right to freedom of religion, local laws, regulations, and other provisions that violate the right to freedom of religion should be repealed.

    • Implementation of laws governing religious affairs at the local level should not violate human rights. The PRC government should ensure the genuine enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all, including minorities in the IMAR, TAR and XUAR.

    • The right of all children to express their religious beliefs, worship and obtain religious education with the consent of their parents and legal guardians, and practice their religion should be respected.

Finally, the U.S. government might undertake more inter-agency or cross-departments consultations on how best to get more traction from the window of opportunity presented by the next two years. This might involve convening a joint strategic hearing of diverse U.S. government bodies with a specific China or related mandate. Although different bodies have their respective missions and mandates, HRIC believes that it would be useful for a broader review of the China strategy that draws upon the experience and information of all of these bodies. The format and process is less important than the information sharing and joint development of strategy.

Thank you for your interest, concern, and commitment to promoting greater protections for religious freedoms and other human rights.






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ENDNOTES

[1] See Human Rights in China, China Rights Forum: Technology and Human Rights, No. 2, 2006, available at http://hrichina.org/public/contents/29485.

[2] United Nations, Special Rapporteur on Torture Highlights Challenges at End of Visit to China, December 2, 2005, http://www.unhchr.ch.

[3] The growth of social unrest first became apparent publicly in July 2005, when the Ministry of Public Security revealed that the number of 'mass incidents' had risen by 30 per cent in 2004 to 74,000, and that a total of 3.8 million people had participated in these demonstrations. On 19 January 2006, the Ministry announced that there were 87,000 cases of disturbances of public order recorded in 2005. PRC Ministry of Public Security Press Conference, 'Press Release: 公安部召开新闻发布会通报2005年全国社会治安形势暨火灾形势 (Ministry of Public Security Report on the Trend of Social Order and Disaster in 2005)', January 20, 2006, http://news.mps.gov.cn/right_news.asp?id=1457.

[4] For example, whereas the central government, prior to 2001, had emphasized that the XUAR was 'stable and prosperous', the language has now shifted, and the Muslim Uyghurs in XUAR are increasingly seen as 'terrorists' and 'separatists.' Zhu, B.Z., 'Foreign Ministry Regular Press Conference by Spokesman Zhu Bangzao', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC website, 19 September 2001, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/2510/2511/t14746.htm.

[5] Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution protects "freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration," and other constitutional provisions protect freedom of privacy of correspondence (article 40), and the right to criticize the government (article 41).

[6] For further information, see Human Rights in China, "Trends Bulletin: Media censorship intensifies with new round of crackdowns," February 17, 2006, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/27228.

[7] See Regulations on Letters and Visits [信访条例, issued by the State Council on January 5, 2005, effective May 1, 2005. Harassment of petitioners continues, despite the passage of the new law purporting to protect rights on petitioning in 2005.

[8] The All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA) issued a "Guiding Opinion on Lawyers Handling Collective Cases"《中华全国律师协会关于律师办理群体性案件指导意见》,approved by the Executive Council of the All China Lawyers Association on March 20, 2006, http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn/pages/2006-5-15/s34852.html. This aims to ensure that sensitive disputes do not threaten social stability. Lawyers who violate the rules will be punished by the Association or by judicial departments.

[9] Human Rights in China, "Press Release: Guo Feixiong's Case Delayed, Transferred," January 22, 2007, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/32199.

[10] Human Rights in China, "Press Release: Mao Hengfeng Sentenced to 2-1/2 Years for Breaking Lamps," January 16, 2007, http://hrichina.org/public/contents/32149.

[11] Human Rights in China, "Press Release: Environmental Activist Sun Xiaodi Faces Stepped-up Harassment after International Award," January 02, 2007, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/32058.

[12] Measures for Administering the Release of News and Information in China by Foreign News Agencies 《外国通讯社在中国境内发布新闻信息管理办法》announced Sept 10, 2006, effective immediately, full text available at http://english.peopledailycom.cn/20060910.

[13] Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People's Republic of China 《中华人民共和国反洗钱法》, adopted on 31 October 2006, effective on January 1, 2007, full text available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20061031/22373037276.shtml.

[14] Company partners and sponsors at the Olympics: Coca-Cola, McDonalds, Johnson & Johnson, Kodak, Samsung, Visa, Panasonic, Omega, Adidas, UPS, Snickers, Budweiser, Atos Origin, GE. For complete list see: http://en.beijing2008.cn/90/53/column211995390.shtml.

[15] U.S. law firms (Morrison & Foerster, King & Wood), and public relations/marketing firms (Hill &Knowlton, Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide) have been contracted by the BOGOC. Ogilvy is conducting training sessions for local governments for gentler approaches to media control for foreign journalists.

[16] Verint Systems, contracted to enable security personnel to detect threats before they escalate; American Eurocopter, providing helicopters for Beijing's air police. For additional information, see, Human Rights in China, "IR2008 Update: Security in Beijing 2008 and Beyond," China Rights Forum, No. 2, 2006, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.2.2006/CRF-2006-2_Security.pdf.

[17] For a comprehensive examination of state secrets legislation, see HRIC's forthcoming report on the subject (2007).









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