II. Overview of the SCO

1. SCO structure and decision-making bodies
2. Economic cooperation among SCO member states
3. Expansion of SCO influence internationally
   1. Membership
   2. Role in regional security and stability
   3. Role in addressing Afghanistan conflict
   4. Cooperation in non-security sectors 
   5. Cooperation with multilateral organizations

The SCO is a regional intergovernmental mechanism intended to enhance mutual security and cooperation between its member states – China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Among its stated goals, the SCO’s primary aims involve coordination against the so-called “Three Evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and the facilitation of regional economic growth. The SCO was established on June 15, 2001, when the members of the now-defunct Shanghai Five – a multilateral forum for resolving border tensions between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – formally included Uzbekistan in their collaborative security efforts.²¹

One of the first documents adopted by the SCO member states was the 2001 Shanghai Convention,which preceded even the SCO’s organizational charter, and signaled that a paramount priority of the regional framework would be national security and counter-terrorism. The Shanghai Convention is unique in that it obligates member states to take measures against the “Three Evils”: not only “terrorism,” but also “separatism” and “extremism.” The document is particularly significant because, as the SCO members recognized, “For the first time at the international level, [the Shanghai Convention] fixed the definition of separatism and extremism as violent, criminally prosecuted acts.”²²

A. SCO structure and decision-making bodies

The SCO is structured in a way that maximizes cooperation between member state representatives responsible for their nation’s key security functions. In accordance with the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (“SCO Charter”), the organization’s primary decision-making body is the Heads of State Council, consisting of the presidents of the SCO’s six member states; China’s representative is President Hu Jintao.²³ The Heads of State Council meets once a year to adopt resolutions, guidelines on SCO policy, and the issuance of a declaration setting forth the priorities of the SCO for the coming year. These meetings have also resulted in the adoption of various treaties, conventions, and declarations that govern the work of the SCO. 

Below the Heads of State Council is the Council of Heads of Government, which also meets once a year, but is responsible for the more detailed strategy of cooperation and direction within the SCO, as well as budgetary issues. This council is made up of the prime ministers or premiers of the member states; China’s representative is Premier Wen Jiabao. A third council, the Council of National Coordinators, coordinates interaction within the SCO framework of the SCO’s various ministries and agencies. Regular meetings to exchange on practices and progress are conducted between specific organs of the member states, including defense ministers, general prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies. Secondary leadership bodies include respective councils of prime ministers, national security coordinators, and ministers of foreign affairs, defense, domestic economy, and culture, as well as high court officials, attorneys general, and law enforcement ministers.

The day-to-day operations of the SCO are handled by the SCO Secretariat based in Beijing and the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The Heads of State Council appoints a Secretary-General to lead the Secretariat, and an Executive Committee Director to lead RATS, for a period of three years. Each of these bodies collaborates with their own “institute of permanent representatives of the SCO member states,” which appears to ensure that the SCO operational bodies closely track the interests of the states themselves.

The structure of the two bodies is revealing. The SCO Secretariat is the more public, executive face of the SCO. Working with the permanent representatives assigned to it, it drafts documents and proposals, plans activities, arranges consultations, provides briefings and organizational and technical support for meetings, prepares information, carries out assessments, serves as a depositary, and handles other administrative matters.²⁴ Muratbek Imanaliev of Kyrgyzstan was appointed by the Heads of State Council to a three-year term as Secretary-General beginning January 2010.²⁵ The SCO RATS, on the other hand, appears to be the primary vehicle for implementation of member state security cooperation: “its function is to coordinate the activities of SCO states’ law enforcement structures and special services.”²⁶

RATS was established through the Shanghai Convention and the SCO Charter with a vaguely defined mandate to combat acts of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.²⁷ While RATS currently does not itself deploy special forces,²⁸ “it is a framework for coordination, information and analytical support for the competent agencies in the SCO member countries with relevant material on combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism.”²⁹ Along with its institute of permanent representatives, RATS is comprised of two key units: the RATS Council and the RATS Executive Committee.

The RATS Council has the attributes of a powerful unit, instrumental to overall security cooperation of the member states. Notably, the RATS Council is made up of high-ranking officials of the national security apparatuses of the SCO member states.³⁰ This includes, for Russia, Sergey Smirnov, First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service³¹ (one of the successor agencies to the KGB, focusing on domestic security), and for Kazakhstan, Adil Shayakhmetov, First Vice Chairman of the Kazakh National Security Committee³² (also a KGB successor institution). Meng Hongwei, China’s Vice Minister of Public Security, is the RATS Council representative for China, and was reportedly appointed to chair the RATS Council in September 2010 for a one-year period.³³ The RATS Council is responsible for recommending a candidate for the position of RATS Executive Committee Director for vote by the Heads of State Council.³⁴ It also “determine[s] the manner in which the fundamental objectives and functions of RATS . . . shall be carried out,” and makes “resolutions of a mandatory nature on all matters of substance, including financial issues.”³⁵ The RATS Council appears to report directly to the Heads of State Council.³⁶

The RATS Executive Committee, led by RATS Director Dzhenisbek Dzhumanbekov of Kazakhstan, heads the center’s coordination of operations and data exchange among individual member states. The committee is comprised of representatives from the SCO member states and “is divided into 5 sectors: 1) Coordination and operational activities; 2) Information and analytical activities; 3) International legal support; 4) Administration and financial activities; 5) Security and staffing issues.”³⁷ Its primary activities are “to establish and maintain operation of the SCO RATS data bank; to maintain contacts and exchange of materials on the issues of combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism with other international organizations and states; to assist in the detection of terrorist attacks prepared within the SCO member states; to prepare information and analytical reviews on the issues of combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism both within the SCO member states and on the global scale.”³⁸

The RATS Executive Committee reportedly began functioning on January 1, 2004,³⁹ and the official opening of the RATS office in Tashkent took place on June 17 of the same year.⁴⁰ Notably, officers of the RATS Executive Committee are appointed by the Director, with the consent of the RATS Council, “from among the citizens of the Parties, taking into consideration the contributions of the respective Parties to the budget of the SCO . . . .”⁴¹ It is therefore probable that China’s influence weighs heavily, in light of its financial contribution.

Publicly-available details on the actual operations of RATS are limited. (Normative documents concerning RATS operations that have been made public are included in Appendix A.) The body has evolved significantly over the past few years, and while the full extent of its operations is unclear, it appears poised to become a major hub for data exchange and counter-terrorism cooperation. (See Section IV.F infra.) The SCO Charter noted the existence of RATS as a standing body of the SCO, but specifically provided that RATS’s main objectives, functions, constitutive principles, and rules of procedure would be governed by a separate international treaty between the SCO members.⁴² On June 7, 2002, SCO member states entered into an Agreement Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (“2002 RATS Agreement”), which lays out these aspects of RATS. According to this agreement, RATS was “intended to assist in the coordination and collaboration of the Parties’ competent agencies in combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism, as these acts are defined in the [Shanghai] Convention.”⁴³ The problematic Three Evils approach of the Shanghai Convention is therefore institutionalized within RATS.

As the primary body responsible for implementing counter-terrorism cooperation within the SCO, RATS’s integration of, and compliance with, international human rights norms and standards in its operations are crucial. The limited documentation on the body that is publicly available indicates that RATS’s powers of implementation are quite far-reaching, with the potential to impact broadly on human rights. (See Section IV.F infra.) The 2002 RATS Agreement tasks the organization with the following:

1. developing of proposals and recommendations concerning the development of cooperation in combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism for the relevant SCO structures, including at the request of the Parties;
2. assistance to the competent agencies of the Parties at the request of one of the Parties in combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism, including in accordance with the provisions of the [Shanghai] Convention;
3. collection and analysis of information received by RATS from the Parties regarding issues of combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism;
4. formation of the RATS database, specifically regarding:
   • international terrorist, separatist, and other extremist organizations, their structure, leaders, and members, other individuals associated with these organizations, as well as the financing sources and channels of these organizations;
   • status, dynamics, and trends in the spread of terrorism, separatism, and extremism that affect the interests of the Parties;
   • non-governmental organizations and individuals providing support for terrorism, separatism, and extremism;
5. providing information upon requests by the competent agencies of the Parties;
6. assistance in preparing and executing anti-terrorist command and staff exercises and operational and tactical exercises upon request by the Parties concerned;
7. assistance in the preparation and execution of operational search and other actions in combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism upon the request of the Parties;
8. assistance in conducting international searches for individuals alleged to have committed activities set forth in Article 1(1) of the [Shanghai] Convention in order to criminally prosecute them;
9. participation in preparing international legal documents affecting issues of combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism;
10. assistance in training specialists and instructors for anti-terrorist subdivisions;
11. participation in preparing and conducting research and practice conferences and seminars, and assistance in exchanging experience regarding issues of combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism;
12. establishment and support of working contacts with international organizations engaged in issues of combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism.⁴⁴

In addition to the foundational 2002 RATS Agreement, in July 2005, RATS operations were further concretized through the adoption of a Concept of Cooperation Between SCO Member States in Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism (“Concept of Cooperation of the SCO Member States”), which “determine[d] the fundamental goals, objectives, principles, avenues, and forms of cooperation between SCO member states in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, as well as the mechanism of its implementation.”⁴⁵ According to this concept:

The fundamental forms of cooperation are:

1. Conducting concerted preventive activities.
2. Conducting concerted operational search and investigative actions.
3. Conducting joint anti-terrorist activities.
4. Exchanging operational search, informational, and forensic information, including information on acts of terrorism, separatism, and extremism in the course of preparation or that have been committed, the individuals and organizations associated with them, and the creation of specialized databases and communication systems, including a confidential one.
5. Providing legal assistance.
6. Organizing and conducting joint anti-terrorist exercises, personnel development, exchanging work experience and methodical literature on issues of combating separatism, and extremism, and carrying out joint academic research in said field.⁴⁶

The RATS Council has also regularly promulgated programs for cooperation between member states in fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism, which appear to provide the basis for RATS activities during particular years – the first “plan of organizing cooperation,” for the 2004-2006 period, was approved on April 30, 2004.⁴⁷ Programs of cooperation were subsequently adopted for the 2007-2009 and 2010-2012 periods.⁴⁸ The contents of these programs of cooperation, however, have not been made public.

- top -

B. Economic cooperation among SCO member states

The SCO’s mutual security efforts are further bolstered through economic ties facilitated under the SCO framework. This is particularly apparent through recent SCO member interactions in the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2007. For instance, on June 16, 2009, at the annual SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, President Hu Jintao of China offered economic recovery assistance in the form of a $10 billion dollar loan to fellow SCO member governments.⁴⁹ SCO members have also launched the so-called Joint Initiative of Global Economic Crisis Counteraction, an agreement between SCO members that was adopted on October 14, 2009.⁵⁰ As stated by the SCO, the purpose of the initiative is to enhance multilateral economic cooperation in tackling the consequences of the global financial crisis and ensuring further economic development of the SCO member states.⁵¹

The SCO’s economic development agenda provides insight into the uniquely influential role played by the Chinese government within the SCO. As one of the world’s biggest and fastest-growing economies, protected by one of the largest military forces in the world, China’s clout within the SCO outweighs all other SCO members. In addition to its $10 billion loan to fellow SCO governments, China is a strong and vocal supporter of the Joint Initiative of Global Economic Crisis Counteraction. China has also played a vital role in a number of key SCO-facilitated enterprises in recent years, including the 1,833 kilometer China-Central Asia natural gas pipeline linking China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, officially opened on December 14, 2009.⁵² China’s President Hu Jintao marked the occasion by declaring the project a “carrier of goodwill for friendship and mutual benefits of the four countries.”⁵³ He similarly described the completion of a 620-mile oil pipeline linking China and Russia: “The smooth completion of the pipeline project is a model for the two countries’ mutually beneficial win-win cooperation and a milestone for China-Russia energy cooperation.”⁵⁴ 2009 also saw the signing of $3.5 billion in transactions between Chinese and Russian companies, including inter-bank lending and natural gas sales agreements, during side meetings held in parallel with the October 2009 SCO summit in Beijing.⁵⁵

In addition, Chinese state-owned enterprises can extend the scope and impact of economic activities. For example, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation, a Chinese state-owned conglomerate, has undertaken a $3.4 billion project to extract up to 11 million tons of copper from SCO contact Afghanistan, amounting to by far the largest foreign investment project in that country.⁵⁶ These kinds of economic cooperation projects involving actors beyond SCO member states, including partners and others, expand the influence of the SCO’s policies and practices.

China has also proposed the creation of an SCO development bank to broaden financing for Central Asian energy exploration and infrastructure projects, including oil and gas pipelines across SCO member state borders.⁵⁷ In December 2010, China reportedly proposed an initial $8 billion investment in the bank, to be joined with an investment of only $2 billion from all other SCO members combined.⁵⁸ This raises concerns about the implications of a Central Asian development financing mechanism structured so heavily in China’s favor.

- top -

C. Expansion of SCO influence internationally

Ten years since its establishment, the SCO’s influence has increased, as have its interactions with states and multilateral organizations seeking to benefit from cooperation with the group. Recent developments related to and statements of the international community, as well as the SCO, its member states, observer status states, and dialogue partners, reflect the SCO’s desire to expand its scope and several of its constituents’ interests in establishing a more prominent position within the SCO. Currently, Belarus and Sri Lanka are dialogue partners; states with observer status at the SCO include India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan.⁵⁹

The SCO appears on track to expand. At the SCO’s ninth prime ministers’ meeting in Dushanbe on November 25, 2010, Wen Jiabao pointed out:

The global political and economic situation is undergoing profound and complicated changes. We must rely on collective strength to better maintain regional peace and stability and promote comprehensive and balanced economic, social and cultural development. This is not only in the interest of member states but will contribute to the enhancement of the SCO’s rallying force and appeal.⁶⁰

The SCO has also recently concretized the channels through which multilateral organizations and countries may become involved with the SCO.

i. Membership

At the SCO’s 2010 annual summit,⁶¹ SCO leaders approved Regulations on the Procedure for Admitting New Members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (“SCO New Member Regulations”).⁶² With respect to extending the number of SCO participants, it was also announced that the Council of National Coordinators “will prepare a standard Memorandum and other documents regulating legal, organizational and financial aspects of the membership to the Organization for entering states.”⁶³ Neither the SCO New Member Regulations nor the Memorandum, however, were made publicly available.⁶⁴ However, given announcements made at the summit, it appears that the SCO New Member Regulations will “limit[] membership to countries within the Eurasian continent that have diplomatic relations with other [SCO] members and are either SCO observers or dialogue partners.”⁶⁵ In addition, in a declaration announced at the 2010 summit, it was indicated that countries under UN sanctions would be barred from membership.⁶⁶ As SCO Secretary-General Imanaliev indicated in February 2010, “One important principle is that the new member should be good for [the] SCO’s growth and unification, not the other way round…. Enlarging membership is an important task for [the] SCO at present and for a long time in the future.”⁶⁷

The SCO New Member Regulations are meant to lay “the foundation for [the SCO’s] future expansion,”⁶⁸ which is a noteworthy change of course from the SCO’s original charter. Indeed, the SCO Charter only provided a generalized foundation for expansion based on a potential member’s commitment to the SCO’s obligations: “membership shall be open for other States in the region that undertake to respect the objectives and principles of this Charter and to comply with the provisions of other international treaties and instruments adopted in the framework of SCO.”⁶⁹

Shortly after the 2010 summit in which the SCO created an institutional framework for expansion, India, Iran, and Pakistan expressed interest in obtaining membership status at the SCO’s ninth prime ministers’ meeting in Dushanbe. India’s External Affairs Minister, S. M. Krishna, said, “We have been playing a role as an observer, and now want to play a bigger role in SCO which has countries as our extended neighbourhood.”⁷⁰ Iran has been seeking to join the SCO since 2008. At Dushanbe, Iranian First Vice President Mohammed Reza Rahimi asserted that “Iran is one of the influential nations of the region and its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will be to the benefit of the countries of the region.”⁷¹ And Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani reiterated his country’s interest in becoming a full member of the SCO given its “great potential to shape the future of our region in terms of security and development.”⁷² (The SCO has been reviewing Pakistan’s application for full membership since prior to February 2010.⁷³)

Given the prospect of additional security, expansive cooperation, and economic development, it is not surprising that countries including Mongolia,⁷⁴ Pakistan,⁷⁵ and Sri Lanka⁷⁶ are involved within the SCO framework. Similarly, countries and multilateral organizations that do not have member status, dialogue partner status, or observer status have expressed interest in developing new ties with the SCO. For example, in September 2010, a Ukrainian diplomat noted that “‘Ukraine is now considering the possibility of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a guest.’”⁷⁷

- top -

ii. Role in regional security and stability

The SCO’s substantial regional appeal derives in part from the framework it offers for improving relations with China, Russia, and key Central Asian states, particularly regarding security. As a security organization, Article 1 of the SCO Charter lays out the SCO’s goals of consolidating “multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability”; jointly counteracting “terrorism, separatism and extremism in all their manifestations”; and fighting against “illicit narcotics[,] arms trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character.”⁷⁸ The response of states in the region and elsewhere to the SCO’s promises on security has been positive. As one Indian official noted, “‘whatever the perception earlier, India believes that [the] SCO has a major role to play in terms of regional security.’”⁷⁹

Additionally, while it must be considered within a broader context of government policy-making processes and debates, a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable from January 2009 provides some insight on the perceived role of regional cooperative frameworks such as the SCO.⁸⁰ The cable emphasized China’s influential leading role in the SCO framework, and the ability of regional frameworks to contribute to global security and economic stability.⁸¹ In particular, it asserted that formal regional mechanisms could serve as an impetus for China to become more vocal in calling out nations with particularly troublesome records of conduct, and more meaningfully engaged in global discourse on economic and environmental concerns.⁸²

- top -

iii. Role in addressing Afghanistan conflict

States and international organizations have embraced the SCO as a potential partner in resolving the Afghanistan conflict. The international community echoed these themes during the July 2010 International Conference on Afghanistan, attended by more than 40 foreign ministers and international leaders,⁸³ including representatives from NATO⁸⁴ and the United States.⁸⁵ As stated in the Communiqué issued following the conference,⁸⁶ the process of Afghanistan’s transition to full independent Afghan leadership and responsibility, known as the Kabul Process, “is built upon deep and broad international partnerships.”⁸⁷ According to the Communique, “[p]articipants noted the importance of regional cooperation to prosperity, peace and stability, and applauded the recent joint efforts of Afghanistan and its regional partners to combat terrorism by ending support, sustenance and sanctuaries for terrorists from wherever they are, and the drugs trade . . . .”⁸⁸ Participants specifically welcomed “the meeting of regional organizations, notably . . . the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) . . . and commended the agreement by these organizations for a plan for enhanced coordination of Afghanistan’s regional engagement.”⁸⁹ They also welcomed Afghanistan’s “intent to strengthen the cooperation with . . . the SCO in the field of border control.”⁹⁰

The UN Security Council, in an October 13, 2010 resolution, also acknowledged the SCO’s involvement in Afghanistan by “[r]ecognizingthe importance of the contribution of neighbouring and regional partners as well as regional organizations including EU, [theO rganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)], Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the [Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)] to the stabilization of Afghanistan.”⁹¹

These developments are not surprising given growing ties between Afghanistan and the SCO. On November 4, 2005, the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was established with the purpose of “elaborating proposals and recommendations on realization of cooperation between the SCO and Afghanistan on issues of mutual interest.”⁹² In 2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai delivered a speech at the Tenth SCO Summit in Tashkent,⁹³ and in the Declaration following the Summit,⁹⁴ the SCO explicitly cited Afghanistan:

A continuing escalation of confrontation in Afghanistan, terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational organized crime rooted from this country remain a big source of threats in the region. Achieving peace and stability in the [Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] is a crucial factor in ensuring security that promotes sustainable social and economic development of the region.⁹⁵

The SCO itself has emphasized its support of the UN’s central role in coordinating efforts to resolve the situation in Afghanistan, as well as the efforts of member states in implementing economic projects there.⁹⁶ Indeed, China has become one of the world’s largest investors in Afghanistan.⁹⁷ The SCO has also expressed readiness to cooperate with international and regional efforts to counter the drug threat from Afghanistan.⁹⁸ According to a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable, Russia “considers narco-trafficking to be its highest priority vis-à-vis Afghanistan,” and concerns have been raised over the illicit financing of the drug trade at meetings of the SCO.⁹⁹

- top -

iv. Cooperation in non-security sectors

The breadth of SCO cooperation in non-security sectors also has appeal to potential SCO members. At the 2010 annual SCO summit, President Hu urged that “the potential of cooperation among SCO members should be fully tapped,”¹⁰⁰ specifying that “[m]embers should work to facilitate customs clearance, quality inspection and transportation, innovate new cooperation models, study ways to establish an SCO regional e-commerce platform and conduct joint studies on agricultural cooperation.”¹⁰¹ This is a logical extension of the statement included in the Joint Communique of the SCO Heads of State Council Meeting in Tashkent 2010: “Member states [intend] to carry out close mutually beneficial cooperation in the framework of the SCO in all spheres in order to strengthen the role of the Organisation as an effective mechanism to ensure security, stability and prosperity in the region and worldwide as a whole.”¹⁰²

Of course, the sphere of cooperation that facilitates and informs all others is economic development, in areas ranging from financial institutions to energy infrastructure.¹⁰³ As described above in Section II.B, the scope and magnitude of economic cooperation, particularly through cooperative financing of large-scale infrastructure, transportation, and resource extraction projects, and notably led by disproportionately large investments by China, underpin the practical implications of the SCO’s regional influence.

- top -

v. Cooperation with multilateral organizations

Finally, the SCO has established ties to a number of multilateral organizations.¹⁰⁴ Emphasis on such ties was reiterated at a May 2010 meeting of the SCO Foreign Ministers Council, during which “[t]he permanent bodies of the SCO were recommended to boost cooperation with the UN, ASEAN and other international organizations and structures on issues of security and stability, as well as economic and social development.”¹⁰⁵ The SCO has been carrying out this work in earnest.¹⁰⁶ For example, at the session of the Foreign Ministers Council of the SCO in Tashkent on May 22, 2010, OSCE Chairman-in-Office and current Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kanat Saudabayev, explained that the SCO and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) “‘complement each other very well’” and “‘propose[d] to support the proposition of the CICA Secretariat to establish partnership relations with the SCO.’”¹⁰⁷ And on October 12, 2010, at a meeting involving the SCO, CSTO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), participants discussed countermeasures to regional crises and new plans to deal with current issues in Central Asia, including security, drug trafficking, and illegal immigrants.¹⁰⁸ Participants also shared their views on security cooperation between the four organizations and “agreed to enhance information exchange, carry out mutual emergency aid, and send delegates for cooperation.”¹⁰⁹ The four sides anticipated creating a mechanism for regular meetings, noting the date of the next meeting as autumn of 2011, in Moscow; and agreed to create a working group on cooperation between the organizations, including among the respective deputy executive secretaries and deputy secretary-generals from each organization.¹¹⁰

- top -

<- I. Introduction| Main | III. The International Counter-Terrorism Framework and Human Rights ->