What Type of “Soft Power” Does China Need?

Zhang Boshu

Why has the term “soft power” quietly become so popular?

The concept of “soft power” was originally proposed by Western scholars. In 1990, Joseph Nye, a professor at Harvard University, wrote an article on the issue of “soft power.” He defined this newly-coined concept as “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own. This power tends to arise from such resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions of international regimes.”¹ Later on, he further summarized the concept in simpler terms: “It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”²

Clearly, the concept of “soft power” is used in contrast to “hard power,” which refers to a country’s military and industrial strength. When the concept was introduced to China, it triggered a variety of responses in the academic world. Recently, the University of Wuhan hosted “The 2009 Forum on Chinese Culture and Philosophy: Symposium on Building our Country’s Cultural Soft Power,” with the attendance of more than 60 scholars who work within China’s political system, including some of my colleagues. Needless to say, a typical government scholar would naturally see Joseph Nye’s theory as a manifestation of the intensified efforts by the West to implement its cultural soft power strategy.

“Cultural soft power originates in the Western hegemonic discourse,” said some scholars, who also commented, “As a prerequisite, we should examine the global context in which the cultural soft power concept was created. The global historical framework shaped by our contemporary society is still the capitalist system. Ideological issues inherent within this system have not faded away. Reflecting on the past 30 years of reform and opening up, the fact that we have not done adequate research in the area of cultural soft power chiefly reflects our failure to establish our own voice to articulate our ideology.”

Other scholars suggested that we need to break away from our dependency on Western cultural “labels,” and establish our own authority to define the theoretical framework and culture that are specific to our nation, converting the resources of cultural soft power into our own “cultural soft power.”³

It should be noted that these views were not merely the “academic viewpoints” of individual scholars, but that they indirectly reflect the realpolitik intentions of the current political rulers. Zhao Qizheng (赵启正), director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and former director of the State Council Information Office, recently stated at another international symposium on soft power that the purpose of promoting China’s soft power was to improve our country’s international image that has been grossly “demonized” by Western media. Since Western media have described China as an undemocratic country without freedom of the press and freedom of religion, the rise of China has been seen by many as a threat to the international community. “This situation prompts the necessity of launching China’s initiative to institute public diplomacy to promote the correct image of China abroad,” Zhao said. He explained the intention of China’s focus on boosting its soft power: “China’s voice will increase in the world. But we don’t have the intention to be regarded as a big and powerful country. What we hope is to get equal treatment in the world. We hope the international media do not have to harbor grievances on China and Chinese people. I hope the two pictures of what the international media report about China and what China really is could come closer to each other. And our goal is to explain China to the world.”⁴

By now, what these Chinese government officials have in mind should be very clear. They want to present to the world a China of “undistorted reality.” They need the help of “soft power” to accomplish this goal. Of course, since Director Zhao spoke at a public venue in front of an international audience, he was rather tactful and polite. But the other scholars that I quoted at a different symposium had been much more blunt and confrontational. They directly assigned the expansion and enhancement of China’s soft power with the mission of combating “Western hegemonic discourse” and “capitalist ideology.”

No wonder the phrase “soft power” has quietly gained popularity and has been written into the ruling Party’s political report at the 17th Party Congress. “Soft power” is now already seen as an integral part of “overall national strength,” which must “develop,” “thrive,” and “move toward the world” as quickly as possible.

However, we have to ask ourselves: can the “soft power” tasked with “introducing the true China” and combating “Western hegemonic discourse” withstand scrutiny?

The genuine “soft power” and “bogus soft power”

There are two types of soft power: “genuine soft power” and “bogus soft power.” If we define “soft power” as culture, ideology, and institutionalized rules, then only the culture, ideology, and institutionalized rules that embody universal human values and the achievements of modern civilizations can be considered “genuine soft power,” while those that run contrary to universal human values and the achievements of modern civilization are “bogus soft power.”

Of course, the concept of “soft power” has a flaw. It seems that, since it is predicated on the self-evident premise of the real interests of a nation state, it can easily be confused with universal human values.⁵ Rulers of totalitarian states exploit this, promoting bogus soft power as the real, authentic thing.

This is certainly the case with China today.

From the perspective of a constitutional liberal, the system of one-party dictatorship maintained by the Communist Party of China (CPC) for the past 60 years is an authoritarian, irrational political system. There could be nothing more natural than for this system to be criticized by the mass media in democratic countries. Mr. Zhao Qizheng’s statement that the international media have “treated China and the Chinese people unfairly” is intentionally misleading. Criticism of the ruling party doesn’t mean criticism of China or the Chinese people. It has absolutely nothing to do with “hegemony.” Personally, I have been interviewed many times by reporters from international media and feel that the vast majority of them are friendly to China. Reporters take their journalistic work seriously, and when they report on the shortcomings in our society it is because they hope that China will make quicker progress. On the contrary, it is the ruling Party that always has a hostile frame of mind and treats all critics as malicious enemies.

In the final analysis, the current form of government in China is decidedly an outsider in the major trend of global democratization. The antagonistic logic promoted by the government scholars is born on this premise.

So what does this “soft power with Chinese characteristics,” so strongly promoted by our government officials and scholars, consist of? Its content falls into two major categories. In the first category are “ideological products” that aim to preserve the leadership position of the Communist Party and defend the existing political system in China, be it in the form of seemingly increasingly individualistic and commercialized works of literature and art, film, television and animation products, or the more rigidly formatted media and educational products. For example, since 2004, China’s Ministry of Propaganda and Ministry of Education have been jointly involved in a huge system-wide “Marxist Theory Research and Construction Project.” As part of this project, all textbooks used for general political courses and all the core curriculum liberal arts material used at institutions of higher learning had to be rewritten so as to reflect “the latest accomplishments” of “the Chinese-style Marxism” or “the Sinification of Marxism.” When it comes to propaganda directed overseas, these are core concepts, meticulously repackaged as something unique and non-Western, something along the lines of “democracy with Chinese characteristics,” “harmonious society,” or “rise of a great power,” with the ultimate goal of establishing “our own ideological voice.”

In the other category are the government-sanctioned “traditional culture” and its interpretations. Confucius is no longer a target of criticism. This, of course, is a good thing. However, at the same time, any rational reflection on Chinese traditional culture has been suppressed. This is because the current political rulers are not interested in the complex historical relationship between modern China’s transformation and its cultural legacy, but, rather, in the usefulness of ancient heritage or figures from antiquity as cultural symbols today. If they can be used to prove the existence of a cultural entity different from the West, then it seems that they can also be used indirectly to prove the rationality of the claim that there can be a political entity different from the West. In this sense, the phenomenon of the bustling “antiquity worship” so ubiquitous in China today is not merely cultural. It’s ideological. The same reasoning can explain the government’s energetic support for the establishment of “Confucius Institutes” in so many locations overseas. Yet, since the ultimate goal of all these efforts is to make the current one-party political structure look pretty and to defend a backwards political system, they would amount to no more than bogus soft power even if they were put forth in the name of a nation state or in the likeness of the contemporary descendants of a great civilization.

Authoritarian system stifles the spiritual creativity of a people

So, in China today, can you find “soft power” that reflects the present universal human values and truly represents the future of our nation’s development? Yes, you can. It resides in the contributions of thought, knowledge, and action made by independent intellectuals who have inherited our nation’s best cultural traditions and understand the essence of modern civilization, as well as by a large number of ordinary citizens who are courageously shouldering the responsibilities of our country’s future. They are the true wealth of this nation and the source of the energy that drives its development.

Under the current system, that autocrats would stifle the nation’s genuine “soft power” described earlier seems inevitable, because autocrats use “party” standards as the standard. They differentiate what is right from what is wrong based upon the standards of the Party. The worst thing about the Party is that it cannot stand any criticism, even if it’s well-intentioned. When our citizens take any theoretical positions that run contrary to the ideology of the ruling party or raise any criticism of the Party’s policies, or if they simply point out some negative facts that adversely affect the image of the Party and the country, suppression often follows automatically in an instant.

It should be noted that such suppression will not only destroy the genuine soft power and creativity of our nation, but will also undermine the government’s own image as well as its painstakingly crafted “soft power.” I might as well mention here two events that took place in Frankfurt, Germany. The first one was a symposium, “Critical Theories in China,” held last year, which was attended by about 20 scholars from mainland China, including myself. Having attended it, however, what I felt was disappointment rather than excitement. Upon return from Germany, I wrote a short essay, “The Lamentable Frankfurt Trip,” to document how I felt at that time. The majority of the so-called “academic papers” submitted by Chinese scholars hardly touched on the real problems facing China. It seemed that those scholars from China’s top universities and top research institutions had traveled all the way to Germany for the sole purpose of reporting to their German colleagues on how many books from the Frankfurt School of critical theory they had translated, how many reviews they had written, and how many research “monographs” on German critical theories they had penned themselves. What we lacked were “the real goods”—the results of Chinese applying the spirit of critical theory to study their own problems—works by Chinese scholars that would raise the eyebrows of our foreign colleagues and make them feel that they had learned something from us. In this sense, the so-called “scholarly exchange” was unbalanced, even embarrassing for Chinese scholars! Of course, what we lost there was the face of China’s academic community.

Even more embarrassing for the government and our country was the storm created at the recent Frankfurt Book Fair when a group of so-called scholars and former government officials who were representing the “official position” of the Chinese government collectively walked out in protest when a few Chinese dissidents invited by the German organizers to attend a symposium at the book fair took to the podium to present their speeches. I don’t need to elaborate here on the various scandals the German media extensively reported on: how the Chinese delegation to the fair applied pressure on the German organizers, protesting the participation of dissidents in the book fair, and how the organizers had bowed to Chinese pressure. I only want to ask this: how is it that a government that uses all possible means to project its “great power image” to the outside world cannot tolerate the views of its own citizens? Is it simply because these dissidents have published a few poems or articles to express dissatisfaction with the current situation in China, or is it because of their complaints about the government? Shouldn’t it be quite normal in a great country like ours that the citizens air their criticism every now and then? How can such a boorish and petty government talk so absurdly about “soft power”?

Having said that, we certainly understand why some of those in power are so afraid of the citizens’ criticism. This phobia is the result of the ruling party’s deep-seated anxiety over its own legitimacy in the wake of the June Fourth massacre. The anxiety and apprehension have been accumulating for more than 20 years. Fortunately, market principles have promoted economic growth, and this rapid growth has fattened the wallets of the central government. Under normal circumstances, if Chinese leaders possessed enough courage and wisdom to take on this historical responsibility, this should have provided a good opportunity to initiate China’s political reform and help the country rid itself of the shackles of totalitarianism. Regrettably, to this day they have not shown such courage and wisdom. On the contrary, they have intensified their efforts to pump more oxygen into this dying system, trying to prolong its life. This explains why the government has been so vigorously boosting soft power. But fundamentally our leaders lack self-confidence. This lack of confidence has been manifested in the crackdown on the Charter 08 signatories, the persecution of Open Constitution Initiative and other civil society groups, the blocking of the Internet, and the recent storm at the Frankfurt Book Fair. Lacking confidence is one thing. But isn’t it absurd and ridiculous to insist on appearing gracious and broadminded to the outside world and going around and talking about “peaceful rise” and “soft power”?

The premise of “boosting soft power” and “China’s rise” scheme

As an independent scholar who is critical of the current system from within, I am not opposed to the terms “soft power” and “China’s rise.” On the contrary, everything independent intellectuals do is for the purpose of making it possible for our motherland and our fellow citizens to truly stand tall and proud in the world and share in the latest achievements of human civilization with citizens of other countries. I trust that other members of the opposition who work outside the system share similar convictions. And this means that we must continue to fight for freedom of speech in China and for the basic rights of every Chinese citizen, because only the respect for, realization of, and guarantee of the basic political, economic, and cultural rights of ordinary Chinese citizens constitute the genuine foundation of our country’s “soft power.”

Why do I relentlessly talk about constitutional reform at every available occasion?

Because only with constitutional reform will we be able to dismantle the existing system of party dictatorship and truly remove the institutional constraints that stifle intellectual output and cultural production. Constitutional reforms will enable us to establish institutional norms and structures that are consistent with the principles of modern civilization, and, within this new framework, to build a new culture and new civilization for a future China through the rational reassessment and creative transformation of its traditional culture. Ultimately, all this will be an important component of the political system and cultural “soft power” of a future China. And only then, when this is all realized, will the political system and culture of the democratic China truly be able to “enter the world.” There will no longer be any need for painstaking “explanations.” China will be able to influence and even “attract” other parts of the world solely with its own natural charisma—to become a rare flower in the garden of human civilization in the process of globalization.

What dictators and the literati in their employ call resisting the “West” and confronting Western “hegemonic discourse” is in fact resistance against humanity and confrontation with universal human values, routinely done in the name of a nation state. Constitutional liberals have never underestimated the complexities of the modern world. Personally, I pointed out many times in my previously published articles the limitations of the existing sovereign state framework and called for the establishment of a new concept of human civilization.⁶ But we must draw a clear distinction between the divergent aspects of universal human values and the interests of nation states. We should also see that the world is undergoing profound changes. The principle of human commonality has the potential of transcending and replacing the principle of sovereign states, although this will take some time.

What we really need is more communication; not only communication among Chinese (including the dialogue between the opposition and those in power), but we also need to intensify the communication between China’s independent thinkers and the outside world. I felt strongly about this during my recent visit to the United States. It must be understood that it is precisely the China displayed through “bogus soft power” that is the distorted and untrue China. China’s independent intellectuals have an obligation to introduce to the world the more comprehensive and objective China as they know it. On the one hand, they will not constantly be thinking about covering up like China’s current rulers. On the other, they won’t be compelled to act like some foreign observers of China who try to please the Chinese authorities to a certain extent so they can maintain their unimpeded “access to China.” The understanding that the independent modern Chinese have of their own history (especially the more recent modern and the contemporary history) gives the world a new intellectual choice in apprehending a more objective and true China. Of course, we must work hard to overcome our own “subjectivity,” but we still have a clear advantage: we have been both the observers of and the participants in China’s ongoing great political and social transformation. Whether or not we can incorporate the observer’s objectivity and the participant’s experience into our research process and demonstrate them in our research results will be an intelligence test for China’s independent intellectuals and scholars. But no matter what happens, our minds are wide open and we have no other selfish considerations or interests to secretly act upon. This is the basis on which we can calmly face the world audience.

I believe that only a new Chinese culture that both realizes universal human values and possesses a distinctive national character will truly have the characteristics of “soft power.” What China needs is indeed this kind of “soft power.” Let us all strive to build and enhance it.

September 29, 2009 Rhode Island, U.S.A.

Translated by Wen Huang