V. The SCO’s Engagement with the UN and the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

As the UN moves forward with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006, its reliance on regional organizations such as the SCO for the maintenance of international peace and security is growing.⁴⁰³ The UN has long recognized that regional organizations have a useful role to play in counter-terrorism.⁴⁰⁴ In 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1631, focused exclusively on the contribution that regional organizations could make to maintaining international peace and security.⁴⁰⁵ In it, the Security Council noted that the UN should promote the development of regional organizations’ capacities to prevent and settle conflicts, deploy peacekeeping forces, and counter the illicit arms trade, under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Security Council also stated that it:

Welcomes the efforts undertaken by its subsidiary bodies with responsibilities in counter-terrorism to foster cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, notes with appreciation the efforts made by an increasing number of regional and subregional organizations in the fight against terrorism and urges all relevant regional and subregional organizations to enhance the effectiveness of their counter-terrorism efforts within their respective mandates, including with a view to develop their capacity to help Member States in their efforts to tackle the threats to international peace and security posed by acts of terrorism.⁴⁰⁶

Moreover, as part of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006, the UN “encourage[d] relevant regional and subregional organizations to create or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres,” and indicated that the CTC and the CTED would cooperate with and provide assistance to regional organizations in order to achieve that goal.⁴⁰⁷ The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy also included, as a capacity-building measure, “tak[ing] advantage of the framework provided by relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to share best practices in counter-terrorism capacity-building, and [] facilitat[ing] their contributions to the international community’s efforts in this area.”⁴⁰⁸ Regional organizations such as the SCO are thus an important part of the international framework to counter terrorism.⁴⁰⁹

Notably, the Security Council indicated in Resolution 1631 that the regional organizations originally envisioned as the targets of expansive cooperation were those working on the African continent.⁴¹⁰ Successes through certain regional frameworks, such as the African Union, may have resulted in a level of trust and credibility bestowed on regional organizations by the international system well beyond that which would be afforded to an individual state. Yet regional organizations such as the SCO, operating in other contexts and with member states with weak human rights records, present serious challenges to this assumed level of trust and credibility.

On the initiative of individual SCO member states – with China in particular exerting its influence, including as a permanent member of the Security Council – the SCO has taken this opportunity to rapidly expand its collaboration with the UN.⁴¹¹ Formal collaboration between the SCO and the UN began in 2004, when the Permanent Representative of China to the UN requested that the General Assembly include on its agenda the issue of observer status for the SCO.⁴¹² The explanatory memorandum of the SCO Secretariat, included with the request, highlighted the SCO’s organizational emphasis on security and economic cooperation.⁴¹³ Disturbingly, it raised the Three Evils doctrine as a strength of the organization, noting that “SCO security cooperation focuses on the fight against three forces, namely, terrorism, separatism and extremism, in order to maintain regional peace and stability. As the first international organization that explicitly advocates combating the above-mentioned ‘three forces,’ SCO adopted the Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism upon its inception.”⁴¹⁴

The UN General Assembly allocated the question of SCO observer status to its Sixth Committee,⁴¹⁵ which deals with legal questions.⁴¹⁶ During the meeting of the Sixth Committee on the topic, the only representatives who spoke on the matter were representatives of SCO member states China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Kazakhstan – all in favor of granting observer status, and reiterating the SCO’s role in maintaining peace and security and combating the Three Evils, particularly terrorism.⁴¹⁷ The draft resolution granting observer status was adopted by the Sixth Committee without a vote.⁴¹⁸ The General Assembly granted the SCO observer status on the basis of the Sixth Committee’s recommendation in December 2004 – without discussion or a vote.⁴¹⁹

Since that time the SCO has participated in a variety of meetings and discussions at the UN, and ultimately sought to formalize its cooperation with the UN in a resolution during the fall session of the General Assembly in 2009. The representatives of the six individual SCO member states to the UN jointly requested inclusion of “cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” on the General Assembly’s agenda.⁴²⁰ Unlike the themes raised when the SCO first sought observer status, the explanatory memorandum and draft resolution included as annexes to this request did not emphasize security – rather, they focused on the SCO’s potential to work with the UN in development-related areas, such as the economy, humanitarian problems, environmental and social issues, etc. As the explanatory memorandum stated, “in order to enhance the practical component of this cooperation and ensure its synergy for the purpose of addressing tasks in the socio-economic field, it is necessary to make relations between the Organization and the United Nations more systematic. This would be the aim of the General Assembly resolution.”⁴²¹ The explanatory memorandum also noted the SCO’s partnership with the development-oriented UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), with which the SCO had signed a memorandum of understanding in January 2008 to cooperate in the areas of economy, trade, environment, energy, and transportation infrastructure.⁴²² This time, the General Assembly’s General Committee allocated the agenda item “cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” to the plenary session, rather than a specific committee, under heading “I (organizational, administrative and other matters).”⁴²³

Yet, while the resolution’s original incarnation focused on interaction in the socio-economic field, between February and December 2009 – after “informal consultations”⁴²⁴ – the resolution was recalibrated to again emphasize the SCO’s security credentials. Uzbekistan, which held the chairmanship of the SCO during 2009, took the lead in pushing the issue forward. In a September 2009 plenary meeting of the General Assembly, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs urged, “The interdependence of regional and global problems necessitates close cooperation between the United Nations and such regional structures as the [SCO]. In its capacity as the current Chair of the [SCO], Uzbekistan intends to intensify interaction between the United Nations and the [SCO] by turning the cooperation into a real partnership.”⁴²⁵ He went on to note as priority areas of interaction not only “economic, social and humanitarian development,” but also “security and stability,” and called upon UN member states to support the cooperation resolution.⁴²⁶

Uzbekistan’s representative to the UN also urged closer partnership between the UN and SCO in discussions of the Sixth Committee on measures to eliminate international terrorism – noting in particular that the “chief focus of the work of SCO was on combating international terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime,” and that “regular contact should be established between the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of SCO in Tashkent and the relevant United Nations bodies, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee.”⁴²⁷

On December 7, 2009, the SCO member states introduced a revised draft resolution, which added language that the SCO “has become an essential forum for addressing security in the region in all its dimensions,” taking note of SCO activity “aimed at strengthening peace, security, and stability in the region, countering terrorism, separatism and extremism . . . .”⁴²⁸ The six SCO member states were joined by Pakistan (which has SCO observer status) and the Dominican Republic as sponsors of the draft resolution.⁴²⁹ The General Assembly adopted the revised resolution by consensus,⁴³⁰ apparently without consideration of the dangers of the SCO framework that this whitepaper outlines – including the Three Evils approach enshrined in both the Shanghai Convention and the language of the cooperation resolution itself.

Instead, the cooperation resolution “not[ed] with satisfaction that the declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization confirms the commitment of its States to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,” proposed that the UN Secretary-General hold regular consultations with the Secretary-General of the SCO, and further proposed that “the specialized agencies, organizations, programmes and funds of the United Nations system cooperate with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with a view to jointly implementing programmes to achieve their goals.”⁴³¹ The resolution took into consideration that some SCO member states have “economies in transition” – a priority target of support for the UN.⁴³² Again, however, during the meeting of the General Assembly in which the resolution was considered, only representatives associated with the SCO spoke: the representative of Uzbekistan, who introduced the resolution on behalf of the SCO member states, and the Secretary-General of the SCO itself, given that the SCO could now participate in meetings of the General Assembly as an intergovernmental organization with observer status.⁴³³

The SCO, RATS, and China in particular have used this momentum as an opportunity to advance the objectives and standing of the SCO on the international stage. Notably, when China assumed its Security Council presidency in January 2010, it took the opportunity “to convene a thematic debate to explore ideas and measures for strengthening the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.”⁴³⁴ This was the first time that China ever organized a thematic debate on its own initiative during its presidency.⁴³⁵ Thus, in January 2010, a two-day retreat took place that brought together officials from 11 regional organizations,⁴³⁶ including the SCO, and the UN Secretary-General. The retreat was followed by the Security Council’s thematic debate.

As initially laid out in China’s concept paper for the debate, however, the premise of the discussion was that regional organizations offer clear advantages, and that synergies should be formed between regional organizations and the UN.⁴³⁷ The debate and presidential statement that followed accepted that regional organizations – due to their proximity to the problems – were inherently beneficial; no examination of the risks or particular biases of regional organizations appears to have been undertaken.⁴³⁸ During the discussion, the representative of the Russian Federation asserted that “regional organizations had better awareness of situations in their areas and had tailored preventive mechanisms.”⁴³⁹ Moreover, the representative from Lebanon stated that it was a strength that “regional organizations were close to the conflicts and had historical and cultural bonds with the parties involved.”⁴⁴⁰

At the conclusion of the debate, the representative of China issued a Presidential Statement, in which the Security Council “recall[ed] that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, can improve collective security.”⁴⁴¹ It also “acknowledge[d] the important contribution of regional and subregional organizations to the peaceful settlement of local disputes and preventive diplomacy, as they are well positioned to understand the root causes of many conflicts and other security challenges.”⁴⁴²

On April 5, 2010, the SCO and the UN issued a Joint Declaration on SCO/UN Secretariat Cooperation.⁴⁴³ The declaration emphasized continuing cooperation in the fight against terrorism and developing information sharing and capacity building.⁴⁴⁴ In signing the declaration, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated as a given the key assumptions underlying the issue of regional partnership: “Regional problems demand regional solutions . . . This is part of the United Nations’ efforts to increase its partnership with regional organizations like the SCO. The United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization share the same principles and goals in peace, security, development and human rights and all the important principles of the United Nations.”⁴⁴⁵ On April 7, just two days after the declaration was signed, SCO Secretary-General M. Imanaliev met in Beijing with Cheng Guoping of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss “the issues of regional security, international cooperation and the current activity of the SCO”⁴⁴⁶ – further suggesting China’s hand in the process.

Finally, a recent opportunity that has emerged for the SCO to influence the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is an initiative sponsored by the European Commission (EC) and Norway to “establish” a Central Asian regional counter-terrorism plan – an effort that seems to neglect the fact that such a “plan” already exists in the form of the well-developed and problematic SCO framework. Announced in September 2010, the goals of the EC-Norway initiative are to “help Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan establish a regional counter-terrorism plan in line with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” and “boost cooperation against the threat posed by terrorism and build consensus on common solutions to fight the scourge.”⁴⁴⁷ The program will involve cooperation with the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), and will “pave the way for a ministerial-level conference [in 2011] to lead to the adoption of a joint action plan for the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by Central Asian nations.”⁴⁴⁸

Already, RATS Executive Committee Director Dzhenisbek Dzhumanbekov has indicated that RATS is taking part in drafting this action plan on implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.⁴⁴⁹ Its influence on the Central Asian states in this process, given the economic and other support made available to them through the SCO, is likely to be significant. If the goal of the EC-Norway initiative is to support all four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, however, the program must assess and address the SCO counter-terrorism framework’s negative impact on the fourth pillar of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: “Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.”⁴⁵⁰

In sum, the approach of the UN and the international community has thus far failed to address the political biases and human rights risks that a regional organization like the SCO may bring to security cooperation, or to recognize that regional mechanisms may not be able to offer necessary impartiality, particularly in the protection of internationally-recognized human rights. As demonstrated in this whitepaper, regional organizations such as the SCO may count as members states that have reached political consensus on national security issues in which the compromise of human rights is considered wholly acceptable – if not expedient – for national and regional purposes. Regional organizations have the potential to gather like-minded states into a forum that actually reinforces practices that violate international law in order to achieve political objectives.

Coordination of counter-terrorism measures across fora, particularly within the UN, is essential to preventing abuses or the spread of bad policies. The Security Council has reiterated “the obligation for regional organizations, under article 54 of the [UN] Charter, to keep the Security Council fully informed of their activities for the maintenance of international peace and security.”⁴⁵¹ Counter-terrorism cooperation, which is a significant part of the SCO’s mission, qualifies as an activity aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security, and is therefore an area of which the Security Council should be kept appraised. The lack of transparency that the SCO has demonstrated thus far, however, suggests the organization has not met this Chapter VIII obligation.

The UN and the governments of its member states must insist on compliance with international human rights obligations in any UN cooperation or assistance programs involving the SCO. Otherwise, they risk not only aiding and abetting member states in actions that violate the human rights of their citizens, but also missing a critical opportunity to promote the key pillar for advancing effective and sustainable counter-terrorism measures – respect for human rights.

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