Dissident Fang Jue, sent into exile in January after more than two months of secret detention, calls for external pressure, not concessions, to improve China’s human rights situation.

Fang Jue, a well-known participant in China’s democracy movement, was expelled from China on January 24, 2003. Fang had disappeared from public view on November 4, 2002, during a general crackdown on dissidents prior to the 16th Party Congress.

Police escorted Fang to United Airlines Flight 850 at Beijing Airport shortly before the flight’s 5:35 departure for Chicago on the afternoon of January 24. Fang had not been allowed to see any family members since his November 4 detention, and was only allowed to telephone his sister, Liu Jing, after boarding the aircraft.

Originally named Liu Kai, Fang Jue was born in 1955, a native of Beijing. After being sent down to work in the fields of Shaanxi for four years during the Cultural Revolution, Fang graduated from Beijing University in 1982 with a degree in Economics. He worked for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Research Institute of Political Science, and finally as vice director of the Fuzhou Planning Commission. In 1995 he left government work to set up his own trading company in Beijing, but maintained close contacts with his former government colleagues. Fang believed that his move into the private sector gave him greater latitude to express his views and stimulate discussion within official ranks, especially among liberal thinkers within the Party.

In January 1998 Fang drafted a statement entitled, “The Program Proposals of the Democratic Faction,” which he described as a synthesis of views expressed by an emerging generation of middle- and upper-level government officials frustrated with the continued dominance of China’s conservative gerontocracy and disappointed by the dearth of political reforms during the 15th CCP Congress. The statement called for direct elections at all levels of government, freedom of the press, a multi-party system and independent labor unions.

The statement was widely circulated in the United States, France, Taiwan and elsewhere, and Fang Jue spoke openly about the statement with the Washington Post for an article published on January 12, 1998. In July 1998 he issued another statement entitled, “Broadening China’s Political Power Base.” He expressed his political views in interviews with a variety of foreign media, including Voice of America, Le Figaro and National Public Radio, sometimes criticizing the Chinese leadership.

Fang was secretly arrested on July 23, 1998, and Public Security police searched his office and home, confiscating many documents and records. Police interrogated Fang 19 times during the course of his detention, with one interrogation lasting for more than 30 hours. Finally on September 28 Fang’s family members were given formal notification of his arrest.

On March 22, 1999 Fang was charged with fraud, which he strongly denied. Police claimed Fang had illegally sold oil import quotas and pocketed 145,000 yuan while serving on the Fuzhou Planning Commission. It is believed that the real reason for Fang’s arrest was his open expression of his political views to the foreign media, and his criticisms of government policy and leadership.

Fang went to trial in Beijing on April 2, 1999, and he was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison on June 10. Fang appealed, but his appeal was rejected and the original judgment and sentence were upheld. He was sent to Beijing’s Liangxiang Prison, where as a Grade 2 felon he was subjected to the harshest treatment and the worst quality of food and living conditions. He was under surveillance 24 hours a day, and had no rights of visitation or phone calls. Because Fang refused to admit his guilt, and accused prison officials of abusing prisoners, he was further penalized with 25 days’ solitary confinement beginning on December 30, 2000. During his confinement Fang suffered serious injuries to his arms and legs from the cold. He also contracted respiratory and digestive disorders, as well as high blood pressure. Fang’s sister Liu Jing on several occasions requested that he be released for medical treatment, but received no response.

When released from prison on July 22, 2002, Fang was tailed by more than ten policemen and five police cars until he reached his home. Police refused to return Fang’s hukou (Household Registration System) identity card, which is necessary for Chinese citizens to have access to basic resources such as housing, education and employment.
Following his discussion with HRIC, Fang Jue wrote the following articles summarizing his thoughts on China’s human rights situation and American human rights policy toward China.

A New Type of Political Exile
January 29, 2003

A group of men burst into my home, shoved me down onto my bed and handcuffed me, and then, after blindfolding me and pushing me into a vehicle, drove me to an unfamiliar place guarded by soldiers. My housekeeper was likewise forced to the floor and then taken to a Custody and Repatriation Center. After 82 days in secret detention, I was blindfolded again and taken to an airport, where I was forced to fly off to a new life of exile in America.

The people who arrested me provided me with no information regarding the legal basis for my detention, much less did they produce any warrant or other legal documentation. The only law-related discussion they had with me was to tell me that if I did not agree to go into exile in America I would be subjected to a harsh prison sentence for the trumped-up charge “incitement to subvert the government.”

Since 1994 the Chinese government has been responding to international pressure by releasing political prisoners and sending them overseas. But I believe I am the first example of a citizen being arrested and expelled from the country without the benefit of trial or any other legal due process. It remains to be seen whether this indicates that following the 16th Party Congress the Chinese government intends to expand the ranks of Chinese dissidents in exile. But one thing is already clear: releasing political prisoners and sending them into exile is at least granting them their freedom. But arresting a free citizen and expelling him from the country without due process is a completely different matter; it is in fact just a new way for the Chinese government to abuse human rights.

It seems that releasing political prisoners abroad is not purely a demonstration of the Chinese government’s mercy. In return the Chinese government has demanded a high price from the west, in particular from the U.S.: In 1994 the “price” was President Clinton’s announcement that American policy on China’s human rights situation would no longer be a factor in granting Most Favored Nation status to China. In 1997 the “price” was agreeing to a visit to the U.S. by Party Chairman Jiang Zemin. In 1998 the “price” was the U.S. government’s agreement not to criticize China during a meeting by the UN Commission on Human Rights. But the price the U.S. government paid did not result in any substantive improvement to China’s human rights situation, or any change in the Chinese government’s human rights policy.

The fact is that over the last few years China’s human rights situation has steadily deteriorated. The key question now is: how can American policy regarding China’s human rights be made to produce more far-reaching and long-lasting results? In recent months the Chinese government has released a number of political dissidents. How high of a price has the Chinese government demanded for these releases? Has the Chinese government demanded that once again, at this year’s meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the U.S. government should refrain from criticizing China? Does the Chinese government hope that the U.S. government will display a welcoming attitude toward the new conservative leadership following the 16th Party Congress? Perhaps it is time for the U.S. to review its pre-1994 policies on China’s human rights.

The American government, unions, human rights organizations and other NGOs possess the strength and opportunity to have a tremendous influence on China’s human rights situation. Perhaps it is time for the U.S. to demand that China implement a comprehensive new human rights policy, instead of using political prisoners as bargaining chips.

The basic standards for a comprehensive progressive human rights policy should include requiring the Chinese authorities to immediately ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and begin implementing that and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. If the West could accomplish admitting China into the World Trade Organization, and can similarly get China to recognize international human rights standards, then there is hope that China can make genuine progress in improving its human rights.

Cutting the Losses in Human Rights Diplomacy
February 5, 2003

During the meeting of the UN High Commission for Human Rights this year, the U.S. faces the quandry of whether or not to move a resolution criticizing China.

According to one point of view, even if such a resolution is moved, it will not be passed, so it’s better not to move it at all. In fact, the nature of the problem is just the opposite: even if a resolution criticizing China were passed, there would be no noticable improvement in China’s human rights situation. So the important point is not whether the resolution will pass, but rather whether any country will dare to move it. The UNHCHR is the largest forum for discussing China’s human rights problems, so the U.S. has an obligation to represent the democratic world in assessing China’s human rights record, and should not be overly concerned with whether this assessment will be accepted by the entire membership. The very act of criticizing is meaningful in itself, and forgoing criticism is tantamount to the UN community giving tacit approval to a deterioration in China’s human rights.

Another point of view is that this year the Commission is chaired by Libya, and...
After his release Fang remained under close surveillance, but continued to fax statements calling for reform and granting interviews to foreign reporters. On the afternoon of October 20 Fang had arranged to meet some friends at Beijing’s Great Wall Hotel, but Beijing’s Public Security Bureau, having learned of the meeting through their round-the-clock monitoring of Fang’s telephone, sent several police officers to Fang’s home and prevented Fang and a friend from going to the hotel. Fang entered into a dispute with the police officers, who then arrested and forcibly detained him at the Public Security Bureau for more than three hours.

On November 4 a dozen policemen appeared at Fang’s home and took him away, also arresting his housekeeper, Wang Jinzhi.

Since arriving in the U.S., Fang has gone to live in Boston, where he is now a visiting scholar at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University.

While still in transit between his old and new lives, Fang Jue spent a few days in New York at the invitation of HRIC. On the evening of January 30 Fang joined in a forum with several HRIC directors and supporters in the HRIC office. Participants included HRIC president Liu Qing, co-chairman Bob Bernstein, executive director Sharon Hom, directors Andrew Nathan, Tong Yi, Li Lu, and Scott Greathead, China law expert Jerome Cohen, and Minky Worden, electronic media director for Human Rights Watch. Following are excerpts from that conversation.

**Fang Jue** I would first like to thank everybody for coming. I’m very happy to have a chance to meet these important supporters and board members of HRIC.

I’d like to briefly raise two questions for discussion. First I’d like to talk about what the policies of the new Chinese leadership might be regarding China’s human rights. From what I understand, the new leader elected by the 16th Party Congress, Hu Jintao, appears to be relatively moderate and politically weak. Because Hu Jintao is relatively weak and moderate, there may be more room for western pressure on the Chinese leadership. But I don’t think we should hold out a lot of hope for this. Of the nine new Politburo members, five are conservatives. Five makes a majority, and a democracy has to respect the decisions of the majority, which is the conservatives. And Jiang Zemin is still in control of the military. So even though Hu Jintao may be weaker and more moderate than Jiang Zemin, there is very limited room for a more liberal power base, so we need America and other Western countries to put even more pressure on China regarding human rights issues. This is my first thought.

My second thought is that Western NGOs may be able to have more impact on China’s human rights situation than before. It’s very hard for people to get access to the top levels of the leadership, because the door to the Communist Party is very heavy and thick; it’s not easy to open. NGOs can choose to push harder or more lightly. So the doors might be easier to open at the NGO level in China. The NGOs in the west will have a number of opportunities in China. For example, strengthening communications with China’s liberal intellectuals and with those fighting for religious freedom in China, as well as leaders of the minorities in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. And the NGOs can also contact China’s burgeoning environmental and consumer protection groups.

Strengthening these contacts will enhance public awareness of human rights issues in China. And these types of communication are somewhat less risky than other kinds. It can put a new kind of pressure on the Chinese government. So I hope NGOs such as HRIC will take advantage of the situation to increase involvement in China’s human rights. But my thoughts are not very mature, and I would like to hear your more interesting ideas.

**HRIC** My question is on putting on pressure through the spread of information. Is it helpful to have information in Chinese about human rights in China and outside China?

**Fang Jue** According to my understanding, the overwhelming majority of Chinese, including top intellectuals, have very little understanding of the human rights situation outside of China. So the first step is probably to broaden the flow of information to the Chinese audience. For this purpose Chinese-language materials would be more effective than English.

**HRIC** What means should we use to enlarge their knowledge?

**Fang Jue** The first means to increase knowledge is through the Internet. A second way is through Hong Kong. European and American groups can send information to immigrants from China, and they can send it back to China through their relatives. You can also disseminate information to scholars, students, businessmen, officials and others from China, who can bring the materials back to China.

**HRIC** How about contacts with entrepreneur groups – can those be used to promote human rights?

**Fang Jue** Yes.

**HRIC** So there are many indirect ways.

**Fang Jue** Yes. There are many indirect ways. Of course we could also fly over China and dump leaflets!

**HRIC** Will the people in China be interested in information that’s brought back from overseas?

**Fang Jue** As far as I know, many businessmen and intellectuals, even though they are not activists, are very interested in these matters. So if these materials are presented in a lively way they would be interested in bringing them back to China.

**HRIC** Should we give them information about human rights, or democracy or constitutionalism?

**Fang Jue** Chinese are very unfamiliar with constitutional
for that reason if the U.S. moves a resolution criticizing China it will definitely not be passed.

But the U.S. cannot give up its efforts on human rights just because a rogue nation has taken on the chairmanship of the Commission. This is reminiscent of two years ago when the Human Rights Commission dropped the U.S. from its membership. Because the majority of the world’s nations are not democracies, and because most of the members of the Human Rights Commission are not genuine democratic representatives, that is all the more reason why the U.S. needs to decisively criticize governments that abuse human rights. If the U.S. retreats before a federation of non-democratic countries, this will contribute to even less hopeful prospects for the world.

Another analysis worth considering is if the U.S. does not move a resolution criticizing China, perhaps the Chinese government will be willing to compromise more with American demands for human rights improvements.

But this is wishful thinking. The post-16th Party Congress leadership has no plans to improve China’s human rights policies. In fact, apart from some special cases, including mine, in which dissidents have been allowed to go to the U.S., China’s human rights situation has deteriorated in many respects. If the U.S. does not move a resolution this year criticizing China, this will send a false message to the new Chinese leadership: the U.S. accepts China’s present human rights situation and human rights policies. This message will probably strengthen rather than weaken the Chinese government’s wrongful actions in human rights.

America’s 1998 human rights diplomacy may be instructive. At that time the 15th Party Congress and the 9th Session of the National People’s Congress had just ended. The European Union came out first to say that it would not support a resolution in the Human Rights Commission criticizing China, and soon after that the Clinton administration said it would not move a resolution criticizing China that year. China’s part in that compromise was to release one political prisoner on “medical parole” to the U.S. But a few months later, after President Clinton’s visit to China ended on July 3, 1998, China’s human rights record rapidly deteriorated across the board; there were widespread arrests of dissidents (including myself), widespread infringements on religious freedom, more suppressive action against minority groups and labor activists, and so on. China’s human rights situation has not made a change for the better up to the present. For that reason, the U.S. should take some action in 2003 to avoid repeating the mistakes of 1998.

The Backer of Rogue Nations

Feb. 20, 2003

Of the many myths about China, two are now being debunked.

One such myth is that since the U.S. has made a number of friendly overtures to China, perhaps China will support the American leadership’s war against the “outlaw regime” in Iraq.

Yet in reality the Chinese leadership has clearly and decisively opposed and obstructed the war in Iraq. On the one hand China has supported several major European countries in expressing dissent, and on the other hand China has exerted its utmost influence among developing nations to depict any attack on Iraq as an act contrary to international law, injurious to civilians, and imperialistic.

Another myth is that because the U.S. places great importance on China’s usefulness in settling the North Korea issue, and has on several occasions requested that China pass along messages to North Korea, China will therefore take on the responsibility of resolving the North Korea issue.

But there is little reason for optimism on this score. China has never made a sincere effort to stop North Korea’s procurement of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, China most recently has openly announced its refusal to apply the necessary pressure on North Korea regarding its dangerous nuclear proliferation.

The shattering of these two myths reflects the basis of China’s current foreign affairs and security positions, which is to provide backing to the rogue states that oppose the U.S.

Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Communist eastern bloc 12 years ago, China’s greatest fear has been that the western world, led by the U.S., would turn the focus of its global strategy from Europe to East Asia with the aim of putting an end to Communism in China. For that reason, Communist China’s political and strategic interests depended on locating and supporting new powers that oppose the U.S. in order to give China’s Communist system a longer run on the world stage.

A new power to oppose the U.S. was quickly identified. China recognized that the existence of international terrorism and rogue states was effectively distracting America’s attention, so that the U.S. could not concentrate on disposing of the remains of Communism. For that reason China has made a concerted effort to maintain open or covert cooperation on the economic and security front with virtually every rogue nation, supplying them with arms and technology and generally using all available means to ensure their survival.

The sudden occurrence of September 11 may have provided Communist China with a historic opportunity. Only a few months before 9-11, the U.S. had already begun considering shifting its strategic focus from Europe to East Asia. But 9-11 forced the U.S. to change its strategic direction; it had no choice but to make the war on terrorism its primary mission. China took full advantage of this unexpected opportunity to play a subtle and dangerous political game: on the one hand China expressed to the west its opposition to terrorism, using this as a new bargaining chip with the west; on the other hand China did not actually curtail its cooperation with rogue states that support terrorism, and may have actually helped to perpetuate
reform, so I think it’s better to concentrate on the concepts of democracy and human rights. Of course I don’t oppose constitutionalism!

**HRIC** We’ve been talking about human rights and democracy for decades. We’ve only started talking about the constitution over the past few years.

**Fang Jue** Constitutionalism is still a murky concept; most scholars are still discussing exactly what it entails, and ordinary people don’t really understand what it is.

**HRIC** I’d like to ask a question about the young people of China. I’m very interested in the Internet and how the new generation can be interested in these ideas. How to reach them and make an impression is a real challenge.

**Fang Jue** Many Chinese young people already use the Internet. The government has been doing its best to crack down on political content, but it has not succeeded completely. When they try to censor something, young people are even more curious and try harder to get it. So if you make an effort to put true information regarding Chinese human rights on the Internet, I believe Chinese young people will be happy to read it.

**HRIC** Human Rights Watch has a new Chinese Web site, but it’s blocked everywhere in China, and so is HRIC’s.

**Fang Jue** Yes, they are blocked. So as I said earlier, we can’t rely entirely on the Internet. We also have to use printed materials. Another important channel is broadcasts.

**HRIC** My question is also, how do we reach the Chinese media, the independent media. Hong Kong is not a problem — but inside China, is there anyone?

**Fang Jue** Most unfortunately, as far as I know there are still no independent media in China.

**HRIC** Organizations such as Human Rights Watch do work on human rights abuses in the U.S., Russia, Africa and other parts of Asia. Maybe Chinese journalists would be interested in covering Human Rights Watch’s criticism of the U.S. government’s anti-terrorism campaign.

**Fang Jue** The Chinese media have already reported extensively on American human rights violations such as the terrorist detainees in Guantanamo Bay.

**HRIC** And violation against minorities, black rights in the U.S., the homeless, these kinds of topics are extensively reported in China.

**HRIC** The message we would hope young people in China might get is, U.S. NGOs can criticize their government, so why can’t we? But that isn’t getting across.

**Fang Jue** It’s extremely unlikely that the Chinese media would report it that way.

**HRIC** My perception is there are local journalists who are increasingly willing to publish stories about worker protests, industrial accidents and other things that often upset the Chinese authorities.

**Fang Jue** But I think we have to make it clear, the Chinese government has very strict internal directives against reporting anything regarding strikes. And major industrial accidents can only be reported after being approved on several levels of the propaganda apparatus. Major criminal incidents such as mass poisonings causing many deaths can be reported, but only within very careful guidelines. So the media can’t report fully and freely on the things you mention. There are many serious accidents and serious problems that are not allowed to be reported.

**HRIC** What kind of pressure would you like to see western NGOs put on China? Would some Chinese people oppose western pressure on the government as imperialist interference?

**Fang Jue** The pressure should target the Chinese government. In 1999 the government signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but the NPC still has to ratify it. The government doesn’t want the NPC to ratify it, so it has shelved it. We should push the Chinese government to let the NPC ratify this international covenant that was signed years ago. This is a legitimate demand, and would appeal to the majority of Chinese people. It’s not an act of imperialism. Another kind of pressure is to demand that the Chinese government not detain and arrest dissidents in China.

**HRIC** What’s the best way to do that?

**Fang Jue** According to my experience, the Chinese government is afraid of only one thing: it’s not Osama bin Laden, it’s not Saddam Hussein, it’s the United States. I’ve had talks with people in the Security Bureau, and I believe that if it were not for the United States, the government would obliterate all of us. They’re not afraid of European countries, but the U.S. has more opportunities.

**HRIC** How does the government view the Bush administration and the prospect of a war with Iraq?

**Fang Jue** The Chinese government’s attitude toward the Bush administration has changed greatly in the past eight months regarding this issue. The Chinese government was very afraid of Bush when he first took office in January 2001. They thought Bush was a hard-line conservative. They worried a great deal that the U.S. would focus on East Asia issues. So from January to August 2001 the Chinese government had a lot of self-contradictory measures and policies toward the U.S. But after 9-11 the Chinese government was very happy
The deadlock between the west and terrorists. With the west compromising, and rogue nations stubbornly holding their ground, China has been able to strengthen its economy, expand its military and consolidate its political power. This has not been a good development for global freedom, security and democracy.

Recently North Korea has expressed a willingness to engage in preemptive measures against America, and has indicated that it may attack America on the global stage and even engage in terrorist activities against the rest of the world. This is just another sign that Communist authoritarianism is every bit as dangerous as terrorism.

That is why democratic countries, in particular the U.S., need to not only decisively attack terrorism and rogue states, but at the same time also maintain a high level of alertness and pressure against Communism in East Asia. It is especially important that if the war on terrorism can be decisively won within the next three to five years, America must turn its strategic focus unwaveringly to putting an end to the remains of Communism, including in China. More specifically, after solving the Iraq issue, America needs to use its power to quickly solve the North Korea issue, and then remove of the key supporter of rogue nations by ensuring effective implementation of democratic reform and systemic transformation in China.

Keeping Score on Human Rights

February 27, 2003

In the current human rights game between China and the U.S., the respective scores are by no means clear.

On the one hand, in December and January the Chinese Communist authorities released two political prisoners, including myself, and allowed them to go to the U.S., which on the surface looks like a foreign relations coup for the U.S.

On the other hand, the Chinese authorities have arrested, tried and sentenced more dissidents, and are currently oppressing more dissidents. This can only be considered a major step backwards for China’s human rights situation.

How can we adequately assess the gains and losses in such a complex human rights situation?

Ever since the 1990s, the focus of America’s human rights diplomacy with China has been to press for several key dissidents to be released on medical parole to the U.S. The U.S. has in fact made some progress in this area.

But it cannot be said that China has not gained its own advantages from this arrangement.

First of all, China has managed to limit the human rights game between the U.S. and China to political prisoners and has prevented the U.S. from exerting effective pressure to improve China’s overall human rights situation, in particular preventing the U.S. from making any demands regarding China’s political development and democratic reform.

Secondly, China has managed to use its release of individual prisoners (and it should be pointed out that this release actually entails sending them into exile) to create a false impression of major improvements in China’s human rights record.

Thirdly, whenever China sends a dissident into exile, it is repaid with a concession from the west. This may be leading to a situation where China, anticipating the need for such a concession from the west, may create “political hostages” to use as bargaining chips.

For that reason, when tallying up the score in the human rights game between the U.S. and China, Communist China cannot be considered to be losing out to the U.S.

If America’s human rights diplomacy with China continues to focus in the long term on individual political prisoners, we are unlikely to see significant improvement in China’s human rights situation, and the prognosis for China’s democratic reforms will be even gloomier.

Therefore the U.S. must develop a form of human rights diplomacy toward China that can deliver broader, more thorough and more practical results. Following are three suggestions that might rejuvenate the proceedings:

1) At the same time that the U.S. continues to bargain with China over the release of political prisoners, it should also make more comprehensive demands: fewer arrests of dissidents; reduction of sentences, release, or medical parole for more dissidents while allowing them to remain in China; and a deadline for ceasing to arrest and imprison political dissidents.

2) The U.S. should make a more effective effort to call for and promote improvements in China’s religious freedoms, labor rights and rights of minorities, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang.

3) In 1998 China became a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but it has refused up to the present to ratify the treaty for application within China. The U.S. should insist on China’s ratification of this important international treaty. This international covenant provides a basic framework for setting up a modern democratic system, and the U.S. could use the covenant to more clearly, specifically and powerfully promote China’s democratic reforms, and raise its human rights diplomacy with China to a new level.

In the long term, the U.S. is not going to be able to score too many points by negotiating with the Chinese government on human rights in isolation. The U.S. has to find a way to inject China’s human rights record into foreign relations, security and economic policy as well. The Chinese people would like to see the U.S. take a more firm, far-sighted and comprehensive approach to China.

Translated by Stacy Mosher
with the impact on U.S.-China relations. They felt 9-11 would force the U.S. to put its strategic focus on terrorism, not on China, and that the U.S. wouldn’t be able to put more forces in East Asia to oppose China. They felt this gave them a historic opportunity. So after 9-11 the attitude toward the Bush government underwent a thorough and rapid change.

**HRIC** And that change was to be less afraid of the Bush administration?

**Fang Jue** The attitude went from extreme fear of the Bush administration to a more moderate fear. They knew the U.S. would put its main efforts toward opposing terrorism, and this gave an opportunity for China to strike bargains with the U.S. in other areas.

**Fang Jue** I think the view that the Chinese government has been created.

**HRIC** Will this be enough for them to support an invasion of Iraq, or are they concerned about the consequences of that as well?

**Fang Jue** The Chinese government has always had close relations with the Iraqi government. I had some interesting conversations in prison with another prisoner who along with his father was employed at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade in Iraq. The Chinese government has supported Iraq not only now but also during the first Bush regime. They were unhappy that they were unable to cast a veto vote in the UN against the first Persian Gulf War because they had no choice.

The Chinese government’s greatest concern is that if the U.S. smoothly resolves the Iraq problem and then the North Korea problem, their next objective may be Communist China. So the Chinese government’s opposition to terrorism is very reluctant and insincere. They hope terrorism will continue for a long time, so the U.S. will remain anxious about terrorism and will never be able to concentrate on the problem of China. This is the core thinking of China’s current foreign affairs strategy.

**HRIC** When Bush became president, Taiwan was a big issue with China, and what he would do to support Taiwan. But when is the last time we’ve heard of Taiwan from the Bush administration? And when will we ever hear it again while we’re preoccupied with Iraq?

**HRIC** On that point I’d like to say this. In 1998 when neither the U.S. nor Europe put motions before the UN Human Rights Commission to censure China, this encouraged the Chinese government to be more repressive at home. Starting in July 1998 the government carried out a large-scale roundup of dissidents. I myself was the first arrested in that roundup. Soon after that the government also stepped up its pressure on the Tibetan and Xinjiang minorities. They also put more pressure on Christians seeking religious freedom and on protesting workers. So the failure of Europe and the U.S. to criticize China in Geneva in 1998 caused great losses. I hope that this year the U.S. will not follow Europe’s lead and fail to move a motion on China, but will move one itself.

**HRIC** When the U.S. was off the Human Rights Commission they took the position, it’s always us bringing a resolution against China, let’s see if anyone else will do it if we’re not on the Commission. And no one else did it. Now the State Department wants to reform the Commission itself. They want to end vote trading and they want to get some serious human rights violators off, like Libya. They’re serious, they learned their lesson last year when they weren’t a member.

**HRIC** My cynicism leads me to believe that the reforms will be too little too late and that China will not be the focus this year.

Postscript: No government was willing to table a resolution critical of China during the session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in April, apparently at least in part because of China’s expression of support for the international campaign against terrorism. The U.S. State Department cited "some limited but significant progress" by China on human rights, including the release of a number of high-profile political prisoners, and indicated that its decision was made on the basis of an "assessment of what is most likely to encourage China to work to bring its human rights practices into compliance."