

LAND AND LEGITIMIZATION IN THE INNER MONGOLIAN GRASSLANDS

BY TEMTSEL HAO

Mongols perceive poor returns for their sacrifice of land use privileges under Chinese sovereignty.

If you ask a Mongolian herdsman of Inner Mongolia to whom the grassland under his feet belongs, the answer will probably be the same as that of a peasant asked the same question elsewhere in China: the land belongs either to the local collective or to the state. But the Mongolian herdsman is almost certainly unaware that his right to use the land he relies on for his livelihood has less legal protection than that of a peasant. The issue of Mongolian land rights and related legitimacy issues hinges on two notions: that of a political nation and of an economic nation.

The Chinese Communist movement can be seen as a part of the long process of building a modern Chinese nation. If the traditional Chinese identity is mainly cultural and related to the past, the new political nation envisaged by the Chinese Communists entails looking toward a common future through the lens of historical materialism.¹ The ideology of a political nation provided legitimacy for the new Communist state to incorporate many non-Chinese peoples, including Mongols, together with their ancestral lands. I consider this nation-building process by the Chinese Communists to have lasted roughly 20 years, from the Sino-Japanese War, during which Chinese communists actively expressed nationalist sentiment, through 1949, when the People's Republic was founded.

In the current post-Communist era, the authorities have increasingly emphasized the economic nation to fill the ideological vacuum created by the de facto abandonment of Communism. From 1979 to 1983, China's land system was transformed from collective ownership and cultivation to a household contract system. This rural reform was also applied to the pastoral lands of Inner Mongolia. Market reform followed, and the resulting "socialism with Chinese characteristics" allowed not only private ownership of the means of production, but also of capital. As the former public ownership and distribution system was transformed beyond recognition, the Chinese authorities began replacing the official ideology of Communism with a new language of economic efficiency and rationality. Economic means have now replaced ideological

struggle in serving the purpose of historical development and national destiny, and the political nation has been transformed into an economic nation in which the welfare or destiny of the whole justifies the need for sacrifice from certain groups, in particular peasants, migrant workers and residents of less developed regions.

Following is a brief historical interpretation of the first 10 years of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), during which land reform, the cooperative movement and communization proceeded as in the rest of the country. During this period, the Mongols ceased to be owners of their ancestral land as the Chinese state assumed ownership of the land and resources of the entire country. In a political sense, the Mongols joined a new political nation envisaged by the Chinese Communists with an emphasis on the common interests and common future of the people as a whole, without class, cultural or ethnic distinctions.

Once this political nation became a thing of the past, however, the validity of the new economic nation and the legitimacy of nationalism have come into question. How do non-Chinese regard the newly-envisaged economic nation, i.e., the authoritarian Chinese state with a freer economy? How can the economic nation provide a credible vision for a common future for non-Chinese? Is this common future justified by shared history and cultural heritage? Is there an internal mechanism, such as economic rationality, or an external factor, such as a hostile outside force or common enemy, powerful enough to bind diverse peoples in a common cause?

The politics of boundaries

The IMAR government led by Ulanhu,² although sponsored by the Chinese Communists, also represented Mongolian nationalist sentiments by advocating for the establishment of a unified Mongolian homeland free of exploitation by Chinese business and oppression by Chinese warlords.³ The leftist faction of Mongolian nationalists was influenced by the Russian, Outer Mongolian (Mongolian People's Republic) and Chinese Communists, and they assumed control over Inner Mongolia soon after the Soviet and Mongolian armies defeated the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The Soviet model of national self-determination⁴ and its early Chinese Communist version enjoyed great appeal among Mongolian nationalists.⁵



A villager herds sheep past a coal stockpile in Chifeng, IMAR. Photo: Getty Images

During its first 10 years, the IMAR government reclaimed the peripheral territories that had been either incorporated into bordering Chinese provinces⁶ or set up as new Chinese provinces during the Republican period.⁷ In the CCP's 1935 Declaration ("The Chinese Soviet Central Government's Declaration to the People of Inner Mongolia"⁸), Mao Zedong promised to help the Mongols "preserve the glory of the epoch of Genghis Khan, prevent the extermination of their nation and embark on the path of national revival and obtain their independence enjoyed by such peoples as those of Turkey, Poland, the Ukraine and the Caucasus."⁹

The declaration further stated "The Mongolian nation in Inner Mongolia can organize themselves according to their own will. They have the right to organize their own lives according to their own principles and establish their own government. They also have the right to form a federation with other nations or to be completely independent."¹⁰

However, the territorial restoration was limited to the IMAR's administrative jurisdiction. Mongol land rights turned out to be a more complicated issue for the IMAR authorities when Inner Mongolia, together with the rest of the country, underwent land reform and the cooperative movement.

In 1947, when Ulanhu united and secured the support of the eastern Mongolian nationalists,¹¹ the capital of the Joint Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was moved from Ulaan Hot in eastern Mongolia to Kalgan. The capital relocated once more in 1952 to Guisui ("return and pacify" in

Chinese), which reverted to the Mongolian name, Hohhot, under which it had been founded by Altan Khan in 1554. By April 1956, the promised restoration of Inner Mongolia's original leagues, tribes and banners was completed,¹² and the unified IMAR was lauded by Ulanhu as the end of 300 years of disunity within Inner Mongolia.¹³ Lauding unification's benefits to the development of Mongolian culture, Ulanhu welcomed 500,000 Mongols outside the IMAR to return to Inner Mongolia.¹⁴

One principle applied by the IMAR government in restoring Inner Mongolia to its original size was to include as few Chinese as possible and provide a stronger population base for Mongolian autonomy. Ulanhu was later criticized by Mao Zedong at the Chengdu Conference in 1958 for his efforts to increase the IMAR's power base and promote ethnic autonomy. Mao Zedong emphasized that Communism—not nationalism—should be the article of faith for cadres.¹⁵

But in fact, enlarging the IMAR actually brought more Chinese cadres into the IMAR government. And because the incorporated areas were mostly agricultural regions where Chinese peasants typically outnumbered Mongolian peasants, their incorporation also substantially increased the overall Chinese population, which already made up the majority of the IMAR. Although provincial border controls and the PRC's household registration (*hukou*) system greatly restricted free movement, the incorporation of populated agricultural areas into Inner Mongolia opened the door for residents of these areas to

migrate to more sparsely populated areas, where they further reduced the Mongol-Chinese population ratio.

When Mao Zedong purged the Chinese Communist Party of conservative bureaucrats or so-called “capitalist roaders” at the outset of the Cultural Revolution, Ulanhu and his ethnic cadres in Inner Mongolia were purged as well. The ideological factor combined with the ethnic factor made the purge much harsher in Inner Mongolia,¹⁶ leading to more than 100,000 Mongol deaths.¹⁷

The purge in Inner Mongolia was accomplished through the imposition of martial law, and by reducing the IMAR region to half its original size. At that time, Sino-Russian hostilities had reached such a level that China prepared for a major defensive war against a Russian invasion, with Inner Mongolia regarded as the front. This defense consideration, coupled with the aim of internal political control, led to the slicing up of the IMAR.

Sino-Russian relations further deteriorated during the Cultural Revolution, and in 1966, the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic signed a security treaty under which Soviet troops were stationed along the Mongolia-China border. In 1967 China began to deploy its own forces along the border,¹⁸ and in April 1967, Teng Haiqing,¹⁹ the deputy commander of the Beijing Military Zone, was assigned to head the IMAR Revolutionary Committee, the new authority of the IMAR.

Between January and October 1970,²⁰ the IMAR was reduced to only three leagues: Shilinggol, Ulaan Chab and Ikhe Zuu. The other three leagues were incorporated into the neighboring provinces of Gansu, Ningxia, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. However, on May 30, 1979, after the Cultural Revolution ended, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council decided to restore the original boundaries of the IMAR.²¹

State ownership of Mongolian land

The effort to unify Mongolian territory and enlarge the IMAR's administrative area failed to resolve the issue of Mongol land rights as originally intended. From 1947 to 1958, Mongols gradually lost their rights to land ownership and the IMAR lost its territorial basis for autonomy.

Before 1947, the grasslands of Inner Mongolia were considered the property of the Mongolian public. The Mongolian aristocracy did not enjoy land ownership, but rather only the privileges attached to certain use of grazing lands. For that reason, the land reform conducted between 1947 and 1952 in Inner Mongolia's pastoral areas was called “democratic reform,” because there was no change of land ownership involved.

During the democratic reform, the IMAR CCP Committee acknowledged that all land in Inner Mongolia was commonly owned by the Mongolian people,²² and in pastoral areas, the IMAR government reiterated public ownership of grassland and equal rights of grazing through a “free grazing” (*ziyou fangmu*)²³ policy. A document issued by the National Commission of the State Council in 1953 affirmed that the grasslands of Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public. It noted, “At present all grasslands and grazing lands in all pastoral

areas, which might have formerly belonged to a whole nationality or tribe, an individual or a monastery, or might have been leased land between different nationalities or tribes, are now owned by the Mongolian public. The policy of free grazing on grassland and readjustment of grassland is extended throughout the IMAR.”²⁴

At the same time, Mongols ceased to be considered the owners of non-pastoral land, and agricultural land started to be allocated to both Chinese and Mongol peasants. For centuries before the land reform, Chinese peasants in Inner Mongolia had been tenants within Mongolian banners,²⁵ where all land was owned by Mongolian residents. One important measure taken during the IMAR land reform was to invalidate the “Mongolian Rent” paid by Chinese tenant farmers,²⁶ and to confiscate land from big Mongolian land owners and allocated it landless tenants, most of whom were Chinese.

From 1947 to 1957, a “no class struggle” policy was pursued as part of the democratic reform in Inner Mongolia's pastoral areas.²⁷ According to the Marxist doctrine applied in Chinese land reform, the lack of private landowners meant no class control of the means of production, hence there was no exploiting class. For this reason the reform conducted on pastoral land did not involve change of ownership, but rather abolition of privileges in land use according to the official IMAR policy of “public ownership of pastures, freedom of grazing, no class categorization and no class struggle, mutual benefit for both herd owners and herdsman.”²⁸

The land reform that applied in agricultural areas ensured that of the lands taken over from Mongolian landlords, 80 percent was given to Mongols and 20 percent to Chinese peasants. Holding the majority of the land after land reform, Mongolian peasants were allowed to employ Chinese peasants or lease farmland to Chinese tenants.

The different types of land reform and different treatment of Mongolian and Chinese peasants reflected a compromise between the recognition of Mongolian rights and more radical policies based on class distinction. Often the difference between Chinese central government guidelines and IMAR government policies was reflected in differences of opinion between Chinese and Mongolian cadres and within the IMAR government. Despite the declared policy of forswearing class differentiation and class struggle, in practice, class distinction was still adopted as an internal guideline by some cadres, and the policy of class distinction applied in agricultural areas was also extended to some pastoral areas.

Rural cooperatives were established in Inner Mongolia's agricultural areas from 1953 to 1956 and in pastoral areas from 1953 to 1958. By the end of January 1956, farm land and other basic production materials were collectivized into preliminary agricultural cooperatives in which peasants (the majority of whom were Chinese) were the shareholders and distribution was based on shares. By the end of 1956, the preliminary cooperatives were upgraded to advanced cooperatives in which distribution was carried out according to work.

Chinese cadres and Chinese peasants were keen on so-called “combined” co-ops (*lianhe she*) consisting of multiple nationalities, usually Chinese and Mongol. Since Mongolian peasants

typically owned more land than Chinese peasants before the collectivization, they contributed more land to the collectivization process. In pastoral areas, herdsmen's livestock were initially taken by the preliminary cooperatives as shares, and eventually became the collective property of the advanced cooperatives. Many monasteries and large livestock owners in the pastoral areas were obliged to join state farms together with their livestock and grazing land, with the remainder collectivized into cooperatives. In advanced co-ops, in which everyone was an equal shareholder and income was distributed according to individual labor input, the distribution Mongols received did not reflect their relatively larger contribution of property and livestock to the collective.

During the radical industrialization drive of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962), the previous distinction between minority and Han Chinese was no longer accepted. In October 1958, the communization of agricultural cooperatives in Inner Mongolia was completed, and by July 1958, cooperatives were established in pastoral areas, with communization beginning in September and October of 1958. The guidelines of the CCP on the people's communes emphasized a gradual transition from the socialist collective ownership to the socialist people's ownership, and from socialism to communism based on ownership by the production team.²⁹ But in practice, in the four-year period between the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), collective land ownership was replaced by state ownership. "Combined communes" were encouraged in Inner Mongolia, and in the process, Mongolian land rights were abolished once and for all, with the Chinese state assuming ownership of the Inner Mongolian grassland.

Mongols argued that the transition of grassland ownership was contradictory to the Chinese policies on the people's commune³⁰ and the 1954 PRC Constitution, and that no law stipulated state ownership of IMAR grasslands except for those occupied by the state and PLA. However, the Chinese could point to the stipulation in the 1954 Constitution that "wild land" belongs to the state,³¹ and as a result, the question of how to interpret "wild land" became crucial to the issue of grassland ownership. The Chinese tend to regard all land that is not cultivated for farming as wild land, and have always referred to the cultivation of grassland as "cultivating unused or useless land" (*kaihuang*).

Ownership of the grasslands was gradually clarified. In 1963, the National Commission and the Agricultural Ministry of the State Council issued a 40-article regulation on working in pastoral areas that stated: "The production teams have fixed rights to use the grassland within their sphere according to particular conditions and historical custom." While this article did not mention grassland ownership, the IMAR Grassland Management Provisional Regulations issued in 1965 stated that "the grassland of the IMAR is owned by the state (*quanmin suoyou*)."³² State ownership of the IMAR grassland was reiterated in the Grassland Management Regulations promulgated in 1973.³² Mongols objected to these two regulations on the grounds that they were not passed in accordance with the legal procedures stipulated by the Constitution, which at the time required approval by the standing committee of the National

People's Congress. The fact is, however, that there would have been no difficulty in getting these regulations approved by the standing committee if anyone had taken the trouble to do it.

Throughout the early and mid 1980s, the IMAR government applied Chinese agricultural reform to pastoral areas, with the difference that Chinese peasants were granted land use rights by agricultural collectives, and the grazing rights of Mongol herdsmen were authorized by the *gacha* (the equivalent of a Chinese administrative village). While agricultural collectives were acknowledged as the owners of agricultural land, however, the *gachas* were not clearly recognized as owners of pastoral land. This legal ambiguity opened the door to ruthless land grabs and abusive practices by Chinese business interests and officials at various levels.

The PRC Grassland Law of 2003 stipulates that all grassland is owned by state or rural collectives if specially defined by law, and that the state council represents the state in owning the grassland. The IMAR Grassland Administrative Law of 2004 does little to clarify the issue, stating that "the grassland is either owned by the state or by collectives." The law further says that the government at banner (equivalent of county) level has the power to convert collective grassland into state-owned land by allocating the grassland to state-owned businesses, state organizations and the military. There is still no law that defines and demarcates Mongolian collective grassland, but the law grants the government the power to designate Mongolian grassland as state-owned land. As a result, Mongolian collectives on pastoral land do not have land certificates indicating collective ownership the way Chinese agricultural collectives do.

Of course, agricultural collectives are landowners only in theory, since the state and governments at various levels can take over use of any collectively owned rural land at their discretion and at whatever price they see fit, with no bargaining power on the part of the agricultural collectives and administrative villages. The common practice is for the government to take over rural land at a low price and sell land use rights at an enormous profit to developers and other businesses. The resulting land grabs and other abuses have become a source of immense misery to landless peasants throughout China. Given that Mongolian herders' land use rights enjoy even less protection, land grabs have become even more common in Inner Mongolia's pastoral areas. It is not unusual for pastoral land 10 times the area of Beijing or Shanghai to be illegally occupied or leased to Chinese government and business interests without a single penny in compensation paid to local Mongol land-users.³³

Nationalism and legitimacy issues

The history of the co-op system and the establishment of rural communes in Inner Mongolia shows that Mongols have contributed more than their share to the Chinese state. Much of the Chinese Communists' early legitimacy and popular support resulted from a social contract under which landless peasants stood to become landowners by supporting the communist army in the civil war against the nationalist government.³⁴ In this process, the Chinese Communist authorities made the offer, and Chinese peasants were the recipients. In

the case of Inner Mongolia, however, when the Chinese Communist authorities made their offer, the recipients were not Mongolian herdsmen and peasants, but Mongolian Communists and nationalists, who gained support among the Mongols by making promises of national liberation. When the Chinese central authorities purged Ulanhu and other early Mongol officials at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, this social contract was effectively nullified.

The Cultural Revolutionary purges, and the continued high-handed official attitude toward Mongolian sentiments since then, have reduced Mongolian cadres to little more than yes-men. In a state such as China, where the only people who enjoy political representation are government officials, Mongolian cadres who abandon their moral obligation to argue for local interests become complicit in the land-grabs and other abuses that put Mongol herdsmen in such a vulnerable legal position. Their failure to function as an ethnic autonomous bureaucracy has resulted in a failure of the whole autonomy system.

In a broader sense, if the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist government was mainly based on providing land ownership to Chinese peasants, the same cannot be said of their relationship with Mongol herdsmen, because the Mongol aristocracy and ruling class had never deprived herdsmen of communal land rights. Any legitimacy the Chinese Communists established among their Mongol allies in Inner Mongolia was mainly political and ideological, i.e., through the notion of a class-based political nation, which unlike the historical cultural nation offered a forward-looking ideology based on a common socialist economy and the specter of international hostilities.

Since 1978, when China embarked on economic reform, the opening up of the economy to market forces increasingly involved not only private land rights but also private ownership of capital, and the former ideological nation began giving way to an economic nationalism that offered an alternative means to the same goal of building a powerful state. Where the economic nation falls short of the political nation is in its rationalization of uneven development and the sacrifice of certain groups, industries or ethnic groups for the good of the whole.

During the period of the political nation, the Chinese Communists were able to accommodate the ideological conflict between nationalism, which emphasizes the cultural line, and class politics, which gives class distinctions precedence over ethnic distinctions. The Chinese Communists emphasized whichever of the two themes worked to their best advantage at different periods, for example, emphasizing the united front and downplaying class conflict during the Sino-Japanese War. Chinese nationalism also played a part in what is typically regarded as an ideological split with the Soviet Union in the 1960s.

In the same manner, Mongol Communists such as Ulanhu and his followers used both nationalist logic and class analysis, and could be called Mongolian nationalist Communists or Communist nationalists, depending on the means and ends at the time. In the early period of the IMAR, they regarded the

Lhasa Nights

BY WOESER

O Lhasa, dreamlike nights!
A certain lotus may have never bloomed,
Sometimes a wineglass shatters at a tap;
Yet there are people, just a few—who blessed
Them with such spirit?—to whom this roaming feast
Seems Paradise for banishment self-chosen.
And if (invisibly) they weep, it's only
For a kinsman whom they couldn't keep.

O Lhasa, nights of woe!
A certain bluebird may have never chirped,
And sometimes garments get begrimed with dust;
Yet there are people, just a few—who spread
This plague?—who see bright fleeting Time as but
A pool wherein the posturing ego sinks.
Illusions countless, ever so seductive,
Can't lure a reincarnate kinsman back.

O Lhasa, nights like nowhere else!
A love there is that never came to pass,
And certain bloodlines gradually mixed;
Yet there's a man, perhaps just one—what kind
Of lightning bolt?—who makes a stifling fate
Serve as the hinge of reconciliation.
Upon the endless wheel of birth and death
I wish you would forever be my kin!

Rendered into English by A.E. Clark

new Chinese state as a transitional step on the way to the ultimate goal of Mongols in different countries joining with all other peoples in a stateless and classless future. But what common future is envisaged by the economic nation? Economic integration and globalization might have pointed to a similar supranational future if the post-Communist Chinese state had not put so much emphasis on Chinese culture and history to compensate for its ideological vacuum. The current trends raise a question for non-Chinese minorities: if globalization is inevitable, why should they have to be assimilated by the Chinese first before taking part in it?

In the political nation, the revolutionary view of history based on Chinese Marxism allowed the Chinese Communists to present themselves to the Mongols as different from and superior to previous oppressive Chinese powers. Interpreting history in terms of class struggle, the CCP held that the oppressive Manchu-Chinese policies, the actions of Chinese warlords and the KMT's oppressive policies toward the Mongols did not promote the interests of the Chinese as a whole, but only the interests of the Chinese ruling-class.

This revolutionary view of history has, however, been negated and reversed in an era of economic reform and inter-

national integration. While dealing with Hong Kong, Taiwan and investment from overseas Chinese, China has emphasized common cultural and historical ties while completely abandoning class politics. The slogan “one country two systems” itself sends a nationalist message to non-Chinese people, who may ask why non-Chinese minority regions cannot enjoy the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong and Taiwan.

In terms of an inner mechanism to hold a nation together, the market economy, albeit one run and regulated by government officials, has destroyed the economic uniformity under the former central planning system and has created huge regional, social, and urban and rural disparities under which ethnic peoples are even less likely to see themselves as part of a new national entity. This is especially true of Mongols, who because of the lack of legal protection of their collective rights are especially vulnerable to the encroachment of private Chinese business interests and international investment on Mongolian lands.

In terms of external factors, Mao’s class-based analysis strengthened the sense of a political nation through the depiction of a hostile international environment in the form of capitalism, the hegemony of American imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. But the present international economic integration and interdependence are not the kind of negative external forces needed to reinforce a strong sense of unity for the economic nation; rather, trans-national economic activities and trade tend to blur state borders and downplay state sovereignty.

The ideological transition from a political nation to an economic nation has fundamentally changed the Mongols’ relationship with the Chinese state, and created a crisis of legitimacy. Given the timidity of the Mongol political elites, and the lack of legal protection for Mongol property rights, Chinese environmentalists have emerged as the most vocal lobbying force for protecting the Mongolian grassland. Many of these environmentalists were sent to Inner Mongolia as educated youth (*zhishi qingnian*)³⁵ during the Cultural Revolution, and spent some of their best and most formative years with Mongol herdsman in Shilinggol pastoral land.

The weak ideological justification for a multi-ethnic state and the harsh reality facing Mongols have given rise to a growing Mongolian nationalism; but this nationalism expresses itself in more negative than positive terms, given the difficulty of maintaining a positive nationalist goal such as a nation state or a legitimate territorially-based autonomy. Instead, Mongolian nationalist sentiments are expressed mainly by denial of Chinese national identity and passive rejection of Chinese state authority. For example, many Mongols would support any foreign team against a Chinese team in international sports, and they would regard any non-Chinese or foreigner more favorably than a Chinese individual. To some degree, these same negative characteristics are discernible in other forms of non-Chinese nationalism. For that reason, various non-Chinese nationalist groups tend to form trans-ethnic alliances more easily than would be possible among advocates of a more positive nationalism.

The negative aspect of Mongolian nationalism is sympathetic to any force, for example, economic liberalism or political liberalism, that weakens the authoritarian state. The dilemma facing Mongolian nationalism is that if the Chinese

state becomes too weak to maintain its already fragile and limited ethnic autonomy system, Mongol collective rights and identity could disappear even faster.

NOTES

1. Editor’s note: Historical materialism, articulated by Karl Marx, saw development and change in human society as the result of the way in which humans collectively make their living, thus applying economic analysis to social class, political structures and ideologies.
2. Ulanhu, also known as Ulan-Fu (1906–1988) was the chairman of the People’s Government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. He was also one of only two ethnic minority individuals ever to serve in the Central Political Bureau, the second highest level of the CCP leadership. Hui Liangyu, of the Hui minority group, is the other.
3. Mongolian nationalism before 1949 combined radicalism against the Mongolian feudal ruling class and anti-colonialism against Chinese political oppression and economic exploitation. This gave rise to Mongolian Communist nationalists and nationalist Communists, most of whom were purged in the early years of the Cultural Revolution.
4. The early Soviet leadership, for both tactical and ideological reasons, promised non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union the right of secession and independence. But by the end of the Second World War, when the Soviet Union had regained control over all the remaining peoples of the old Russian Empire (with the exception of the Finns), the Soviet authorities asserted that a nation’s right to self-determination should not take precedence over Marxist and socialist principles. Nevertheless, the right of secession was included in the Constitution of the Soviet Union throughout its existence.
5. The first documented CCP avowal of non-Chinese self-determination can be found in “The Declaration of the Second National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,” July 1922, *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji* (Selected Documents of CCP Central Committee), CCP Central Archive Library, Vol. 1 (1924–25), CCP Central Party School Press, 1988, p.99. The same sentiment is reflected in “The Resolutions on Minority Peoples Within China,” passed during the First Chinese Soviet National People’s Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers in 1931, and also referenced in “The Chinese Soviet Republic’s Constitution,” Ibid. vol.7 (1931), p.490. The same promise was made again in the famous 1935 Declaration made by Mao Zedong on 10 December, i.e. “The Chinese Soviet Central Government’s Declaration to the People of Inner Mongolia,” Ibid. Vol.10 (1934–35), p.880.
6. Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning and Gansu provinces.
7. Jehol and Suiyuan were Chinese provinces established on Mongolian territory.
8. *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji* (Selections Of CCP Central Committee’s Documents), Vol. 10 (1934–1935), CCP Central Party School Press, 1991.
9. Apart from ideological affinity with the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists had practical reasons for stressing Mongolian issues after they reached Yanan and set up their main base there. At the time, Mao Zedong considered Mongolia a convenient route through which the Chinese Communists could establish supply links with the Soviet Union. For further information on the strategic significance of this supply link, see Chen Jing, Shi Yan Shi (History in Poems); Zheng Yi, “Uncovering the Truth of the Long March,” *Jiushi Niandai* (The Nineties), January 1997, p.98; and Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1937) p.28.
10. The 1935 Declaration was made by Mao Zedong on December 10 (“The Chinese Soviet Central Government’s Declaration to the People of Inner Mongolia”), *Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji* (The Selected Documents of CCP Central Committee), Vol. 10 (1934–35), p.880., ed. by CCP Central Archive Library, Vol. 1 (1924–25), p.99, CCP Central Party School Press, 1988.

11. After the Japanese army surrendered at the end of the war, some pro-Soviet Mongol communists and revolutionaries, young intellectuals and officials issued the Inner Mongolian Emancipation Declaration advocating the merger of Inner Mongolia and the MPR. Hafenga, Penstag, Temurbaagen and other Mongolian nationalists in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia revived the long dormant Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as the New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Later the party set up the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government, and Boyanmandu was elected Chairman. The autonomous government quickly acquired all necessary features of a sovereign state: a constitution, government, parliament and an army, and sought the support of the MPR and KMT government for a merger with independent Mongolia, but was turned down by both. Ulanhu played a key role in incorporating those eastern Mongolian nationalists into his pro-Chinese Communist Autonomous Movement. See Boyanmandu, "Speech on April 3rd Conference in 1946", *Archive Collection Of The Joint Committee Of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement* (Archive Press, 1989) pp. 50–51.
12. Liu Jingping and Zheng Guangzhi, ed., *Nei Menggu Jingji Fazhan* (Inner Mongolian Economic Development), Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1979, p.169.
13. Although Ligden Khan only controlled Chakhar, he was by lineage the orthodox khan of all Mongolia. He was defeated by Manchu Emperor Tiancong (Hung Taiji, or Arvkhai) in 1634, after which Southern Mongolia was annexed by the Manchu Qing Dynasty.
14. Ulanhu, "Speech on IMAR Party Propaganda Working Meeting," 1957, Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) p.169.
15. Mao Zedong: "Mongols and Chinese should cooperate closely, and should believe in Marxism. All nationalities should trust each other. What matters is not which nationality you belong to, but rather whether you side with the truth or not. Marx was a Jew, Stalin was also an ethnic minority. Ch'iang Kai-shek is a Chinese, but is a very bad man whom we should oppose. A provincial official is not necessarily a person from the same province. No matter where the person is from, south or north, this nationality or that, the first thing to ask is whether he is a Communist or not, and how much he believes in Communism. The point should be made clear to minority nationalities. Chinese were not a big nationality to begin with, but were formed by many different peoples. In history, Chinese conquered minority peoples and drove them to the mountains, but the nationality issue should not be judged by history. Which should be our profession, nationalism or Communism? Our profession should be Communism first. Locality is important, but not localism." Mao Zedong, "Instructions on the Nationality Issue," delivered in March, 1958. Ding Wang, *Mao Zedong Xuanji Fulu* (Mao Zedong Anthology Addendum), Vol. 3 (1949–1959), Mingpao Monthly Press, 1971.
16. Tumen and Zhu Dongli, *Kang Sheng he Xin Nei Ren Dang An Jian* (Kangsheng and the New IMPRP Case), Beijing: CPC Central Party School Press, 1995. This book is one of the few publications published in China on the purge.
17. According to People's Daily (Nov. 21, 1980), 346,000 people were arrested in Inner Mongolia during the Cultural Revolution and 16,222 were tortured to death. But Mongols in the IMAR have privately estimated that as many as 800,000 Mongols were arrested, and that 23,000–50,000 were killed, while some 120,000 were permanently maimed during the NIMPRP purge. Mongolian intellectuals believe that the number of Mongolian dead totals 100,000, although this may include all those who died during the entire Cultural Revolution. According to a survey conducted by a Western anthropologist, among 186 pastoral and urban Mongolian households, 56 households (30 percent) had at least one person arrested and 11 households (17 percent) lost at least one immediate relative. The survey results suggest that one quarter of all Mongols were arrested during the purge, and that 100,000 died, slightly less than one tenth of the total Mongolian population at the time. The anthropologist concluded that "there was not a single Mongol who did not lose a close relative or friend during the Cultural Revolution." See Jankowiak, "An Anthropological Study of a Chinese City", *Occasional Papers* (Mongolian and Inner Asia Studies Unit, University of Cambridge, 1992).
18. Michael B. Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945–1995* (London and New York: Routledge) p.62.
19. Teng Haiqing, then the deputy commander of the Beijing Military District, presided over the purge of local Mongolian officials and ordinary Mongols after leading the 21st Field Army from Shanxi Province into Inner Mongolia. Two years later, Mao Zedong recognized that the purge had gone out of control and sidelined Teng Haiqing. Teng later assumed different high-ranking military posts until his retirement without being punished, although the families of Mongol victims petitioned strongly for bringing him to justice.
20. The CPC Central Committee on December 19, 1969 made the "Decision on the Partition and Martial Law of IMAR," under which the Beijing Military Zone exercised general martial law in Inner Mongolia after the partition. The Commander, together with his deputies and commissars of the Beijing Military Zone, formed the Inner Mongolian Front Line Command, which controlled all activities in Inner Mongolia. Hao Weimin, ed., *Nei Menggu Lishi* (The Recent History of Inner Mongolia), Inner Mongolian University, 1990, ed. p.320.
21. The IMAR Survey and Mapping Bureau, *Nei Meng Gu Di Tu Ji* (The Collection of IMAR Maps) (Inner Mongolia News Publishing House, 1989) p.3.
22. Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) p.106.
23. Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) p.111.
24. "A Basic Summary of Animal Husbandry Production in IMAR and Suiyuan, Qinghai and Xinjiang"; Ni Dongfa, "Two Kinds of Ownership of the Grassland in IMAR," Gefu, ed., *Xumu Yelun Wenji* (Collection of Papers on Animal Husbandry), Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1989, p.335.
25. Mongolian administrative unit equivalent to a Chinese county.
26. Liu Jingping (op. cit.) p.106.
27. The policy was called "three nos, two beneficials": no class struggle, no confiscation, no class categories; to be beneficial to both livestock owner and herders. See Hao Weimin (op. cit.) p.38.
28. Ulanhu, "Speech at the North China Bureau Sub-branch Meeting on 11 May, 1952," see Hao Weimin (op. cit.) p.92.
29. "Resolution on Several Issues of the People's Communes," passed by the 6th Meeting of the 8th CCP Central Committee. "Regulations of the Work Concerning the People's Communes in the Countryside (draft)," (commonly known as the "60 Articles"), Liu Jingping (op. cit.) pp.227, 446.
30. "Regulations of the Work Concerning the People's Communes in the Countryside (draft)," op. cit.
31. The Constitution of 1954 made it clear that "each nationality autonomous region is an inseparable part of the PRC." It also stipulated: "mines, rivers, the forest, wild land and other resources which, according to particular laws, belong to the state, belong to the whole people [quanmin suoyou]." Sun Xianfang, *The Laws of Nationality Regional Autonomy*, Inner Mongolian University Press, 1990, p.53.
32. Ni Dongfa, op. cit.
33. "900,000 mu of pastoral land is 'mysteriously missing,'" *Zhongguo Jinrong Shibao* (China Financial Times), August 9, 2006; "Why 700,000 mu of Grassland has been Cultivated" by Inner Mongolian Television, August 7, 2006.
34. The emancipation of Chinese peasants by Chinese Communists is described in William Hinton's book *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*. Monthly Review Press, 1967. See also Qu Tao, "Wuquan Fali Fazhong Youguan Nongcun Tudi Quanli Fa" (The Rural Land Right within Property Right Legislation)," <http://www.law.cn/shequ/xswc/200511141339.htm>.
35. Urban high school students were sent to the countryside by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution to "learn from the peasants" and at the same time to relieve urban employment pressure.