Human Rights in China (HRIC) respectfully makes this submission as input into the report by the High Commissioner on the procedures and practices of civil society involvement with regional and international organizations requested under the Human Rights Council (HRC) Resolution 32/31.

As incidents of retaliation, harassment, and intimidation of civil society participants at UN meetings underscore, domestic policies and practices of repressive governments have clearly achieved a reach and an impact on civil society space well beyond national borders. For Chinese civil society actors, intensified domestic human rights challenges not only undermine a safe and enabling domestic environment, but also significantly impact on their ability to participate safely and effectively in international human rights processes. To ensure a safe and enabling civil society space in the UN human rights system, multilateral procedures and practices must address the impact of these challenges on excluding independent and diverse civil society participation.

Specific legal and political developments and ideological campaigns in China that have created a hostile, restrictive, and dangerous domestic environment include:

- intensified crackdowns on lawyers, including their detention and persecution of their family members;
- promulgation of laws and regulations to further restrict expression on- and offline in the name of an all-encompassing approach to national security;
- restriction of access to foreign support and cooperation to only officially-sanctioned groups carrying out activities under the supervision and monitoring of the police;
- ideological campaigns requiring educators and legal professionals to place loyalty to the Communist Party of China above their professional duties; and
- attacks on rule of law and universal values, such as deprecating concepts of judicial independence, constitutional democracy, and universal values as “harmful” influences from the West.

Through the lens of the challenges presented by China’s linked domestic and international practices, this submission:

- examines the HRC guidelines and practices of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism, and the practices and procedures of the human rights treaty bodies, and their impact on participation of Chinese civil society and human rights defenders;
- identifies some good current practices deployed in the UPR and by the treaty bodies; and
- advances specific recommendations to enable and safeguard participation of civil society actors and stakeholders operating under restrictive domestic conditions, including the current environment in China.

Specific areas of procedures and practices that we highlight are:

- dissemination of information regarding human rights mechanisms and procedures and opportunities to participate;
consultation with a broad range of civil society actors in preparing member state or state party reports;
submissions and inputs by civil society groups;
accreditation of and on-site participation by civil society groups in reviews;
remote participation and access to information by civil society groups; and
dissemination of outcomes and results of reviews to enable civil society monitoring and advancing implementation.

While we note some good current practices that could be strengthened, we are concerned that procedures and practices in these respects are generally not adequate to effectively promote the five elements set out by the High Commissioner as necessary to create a safe and enabling environment. In addition to the specific recommendations below regarding ensuring access to information, expanding transparency and monitoring, and mainstreaming monitoring, review, and public reporting, we first share two high-level concerns and recommendations that are relevant to both the mechanisms focused on in this submission and the UN human rights system as a whole.

First, any commitment by UN human rights bodies to the goals of ensuring a safe and enabling environment must be supported by concrete implementation resources. Revised rules and procedures alone without implementation resources will not generate concrete improvements. The OHCHR Secretariat should be more fully resourced so that it can more effectively carry out its mandate, including supporting the full participation of civil society. To sustainably expand its current efforts, the Office must be properly resourced, including support for strengthening its communication efforts, maintaining an updated website, and producing and disseminating online user-friendly official UN resources that are linguistically and culturally accessible, such as practical information about treaties and treaty obligations, and opportunities for participation in treaty reviews.

Second, improved rules and procedures alone are ineffective if they are implemented in a hostile environment. The independence of the High Commissioner’s Office must be respected and protected against direct and indirect pressure, political intimidation, and attacks in the course of its work and reporting. Any funding contributions or budgetary controls must be decoupled from any substantive or political intervention in the internal operations, policies, and programs of the Office. An important organizational, structural, and operational challenge is how to ensure accountability and transparency for the budget and resourcing by the states, but at the same time maintain and respect the independence of the Secretariat and OHCHR and independence of the treaty bodies. Again, improved rules and procedures will not be effective if civil society—and the High Commissioner’s Office and Secretariat—are forced to work in a non-transparent politically challenging environment.

Under current practice, civil society participation at multilateral human rights institutions may include consulting with governments on their national reports, submitting information to special procedures for state reviews or missions, meeting with special procedure bodies, participating in treaty body and Universal Periodic Reviews by meeting with experts and contributing to the lists of issues raised, and monitoring implementation by states of recommendations put forth by treaty bodies, special procedures, the Universal Periodic Review Working Group and other bodies of the HRC. In the following sections, we examine Chinese civil society participation issues highlighted by China’s record of engagement with two different human rights mechanisms in the HRC—the UPR and expert treaty bodies reviews—and advance specific recommendations for each.
Universal Periodic Review

Under the Universal Periodic Review framework, civil society should play an “important and constructive role” including through participation in and contribution to national human rights follow-up systems and processes. As a work-in-progress, the two completed cycles of the UPR have involved different rules and procedures for civil society participation. The rules for the third cycle build upon the first two. For all three cycles, the OHCHR Civil Society Unit published guidelines for “stakeholder submissions,” but the guidelines are not available in Chinese. NGOs, regardless of accreditation, are permitted to submit stakeholder submissions. Although all stakeholder submissions are available on the OHCHR website, only the ten-page summary report of these submissions prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner constitutes one of the official documents for each state party review. The Office of the High Commissioner’s summary is translated into all six UN languages, but each stakeholder report is only available in the language(s) in which it was submitted. Only ECOSOC-accredited NGOs may deliver oral interventions. All three cycles allow for remote monitoring of public sessions through a live webcast and archived videos.

The two cycles of China’s Universal Periodic Reviews (2009, 2013) illustrate some of the challenges that limit the scope, diversity, and safety of civil society participation throughout the process.

Input into the national report
According to the two national reports that China submitted for the UPRs in 2009 and 2013, oral and written consultations were held with nearly 20 NGOs and academic institutions, and broad public input on the report was sought via the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, according to the list of NGOs that China provided, the 15 NGOs in the first cycle and the 22 NGOs in the second cycle are all GONGOs—government-organized NGOs, which are mass organizations that are either directly controlled by the Communist Party of China or the state, or have former Party members or state officials as their leaders. Moreover, HRIC’s research of relevant official websites, including those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Council, found no information regarding public consultation of the UPR national reports available on those websites.

Written submissions
The scope of civil society submissions for China’s UPRs includes substantial input from international groups: 24 submissions out of a total of 48 submissions in the UPR first cycle, and 37 out of 79 total submissions in the second cycle. Chinese civil society submissions were largely from GONGOs. Based upon HRIC’s preliminary survey of submissions in China’s first and second UPRs, the participation of Chinese civil society domestic CSOs was quite limited compared to overall submissions, with only five submissions each cycle. (See chart below.) In addition, for the second cycle, 15 joint submissions were received from a combined 214 international CSOs or individuals, and an additional ten Chinese CSOs or GONGOs participated in joint submissions, often joining with international CSOs. Yet individual submissions for both cycles from domestic CSOs remained the same. Factors that may contribute to this limited participation include: the barriers of language, lack of information about the opportunity and guidelines for submission, and the political sensitivity and risks of submitting any information or report that may be viewed as critical of the regime. In addition, from the perspective of citizens without any
concrete practical exposure to the process, the UPR may simply not be viewed as relevant or effective in light of the serious ongoing human rights problems they see on the ground.

Stakeholder Submissions Received for China’s UPRs

**Participation on-site during review**

The general limitation of civil society participation at the HRC to NGOs with ECOSOC status presents the first major barrier to participation by independent and diverse civil society groups. The accreditation rules effectively preclude the participation of independent groups, or any group, that a member state perceives as critical or not toeing an official line. It is well-recognized that China and other nations use their vote on the ECOSOC NGO Committee to block accreditation of NGOs that might be critical of China’s human rights record. There are 4,507 organizations accredited by ECOSOC as of December 2016. Of those, 220 are from mainland China, including nineteen academic institutions, and many are GONGOs.

In addition to the barrier of ECOSOC accreditation, CSOs that are able to participate in person face challenges and obstacles, as they are subject to intimidation and monitoring while there and reprisals and threats upon return to China. Chinese state interference with civil society participation at the UN is well-documented, and includes harassment of activists, placement of travel restrictions on Chinese citizens, and intimidation of those attending UN events (e.g., by photographing and filming them on UN premises in violation of UN rules). The tragic case of Chinese defender Cao Shunli who died in custody after being detained while en route to Geneva for training—and China’s subsequent use of procedural challenge to block a moment of silence to commemorate Cao during an HRC session—continues to serve as a reminder of the price exacted by a repressive regime intent on discouraging citizen participation.

This pattern of state interference undermines a safe and enabling civil society space at the HRC and robust diverse participation in the UPR. It is also consistent with and supports China’s comprehensive legal, political, and ideological initiatives to maintain domestic control over civil society.

**Remote participation and monitoring the implementation of recommendations**

For domestic civil society to exercise its full role to monitor and advance implementations of UPR recommendations (and, as described below, treaty body recommendations), the challenges of the domestic environment must be addressed, including to freedom of expression and access to information on- and offline. Remote participation is essential to ensure that an enabling civil society space within the UN human rights mechanisms is not only reserved for those few with the resources and the safe capacity
to travel and participate in person. In the context of China, with more than 700 million people online, the potential of raising awareness of UN human rights mechanisms and expanding remote participation and monitoring is substantial. In the context of limited resources, deploying technology is also an efficient and effective approach to generate impact.

**HRIC UPR Recommendations**

**Accreditation**

- The UN Secretary General should convene a multi-stakeholder forum to review the challenges of ECOSOC accreditation in UPR participation and other modalities for promoting greater civil society participation, including the NGO registration approach of the human rights expert treaty bodies. The outcome of this forum should be a report for further action to the General Assembly.

**States’ consultation with civil society for UPR reporting**

- Strengthen the UPR reporting requirement to require information on efforts to set up a transparent, inclusive process of consultation, including with independent civil society groups and actors who are not affiliated with or controlled by the state.

- Require states to report on how they have incorporated the input of independent civil society into state actions to advance compliance with treaty obligations as part of its UPR obligations.

**Remote participation and monitoring implementation of recommendations**

- Continue the current good practice of webcasting the entire UPR, including the working group and plenary adoption of the final report in the language of the state party under review. In addition, further follow-up should be conducted by the OHCHR to assess the availability of reliable domestic Internet access to the video, both the live and archived sessions, and perhaps develop a local language survey to assess knowledge of and participation in reviews, and technical access to the webcasts.

Promote information dissemination by the state party, the OHCHR, and civil society stake-holders, to raise awareness of the UPR and other human rights mechanisms, including via expanded use of local social media about remote and monitoring opportunities.

- Require states to report on how they have disseminated information about future participation opportunities and outcomes of the first two cycles, including on official websites and via social media.

**Human Rights Treaty Bodies**

impact on Chinese civil society participation are highlighted by China’s record of treaty body engagement including: accreditation practices of the treaty bodies, consistent concerns regarding civil society consultation and contributions to the preparation of state party reports, and dissemination of outcomes and follow-up and recommendations of each review.

Each of the human rights treaty bodies has varying rules and procedures regarding civil society participation at various stages of state reviews. These are often found in various documents on each treaty body’s website, only some of which are in Chinese. While there are differences in these rules, all committees: allow accreditation of civil society groups by registering and submitting NGO representative information to the committee secretariat in advance of the session; accept submissions of written reports, input into Lists of Issues, and follow-up information; and webcast many, if not all, of the public sessions, live and archived. (See Appendix for chart comparison of the different committee rules.)

Based on information publicly available on the OHCHR website—including on the state party reports, summary records of reviews, and parallel reports submitted by civil society stakeholders, HRIC conducted a survey of China’s treaty body consultations with CSOs to map the practices and contributions of CSOs to China’s human rights treaty body reviews. Some issues that we encountered in this exercise were: lack of complete online records of these reviews; uneven pattern of China’s consultation practices and reporting on civil society consultations; lack of follow-up on these reviews such as dissemination of information to domestic civil society; and the predominance of GONGOs in the domestic civil society consultation process.

HRIC also surveyed the Chinese government’s dissemination of information regarding its treaty body reporting and reviews under the six treaties China has ratified. We reviewed the websites of the government entities listed in China’s report as having been involved with the treaty’s preparation—as well as other relevant government entities—for online information regarding the treaty, any calls for input from CSOs into China’s state party report, dissemination of the committee’s concluding observations, and information on the next review and opportunities for participation.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Survey of Treaty Body Review Information on Chinese Government Websites</th>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
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<td>CERD</td>
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<td>CESCR</td>
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The websites were accessed between Mar. 28, 2017 and Sept. 29, 2017.

As the numbers glaringly show, the Chinese government has not made widely available information on the treaties and has not adequately called for Chinese civil society to provide input on them. In no cases, for any treaty, was information on the next review posted. The committee reports were uploaded only to
three websites: the Ministry of Justice uploaded the CAT Committee report, the National People’s Congress uploaded the CEDAW Committee report, and the National Committee on Women and Children uploaded the CRC Committee report. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs website uploaded State Party reports for CAT, CEDAW, and CRC. Calls for CSO input into the state party report were available only for the CRPD and CRC. The government entities were more consistent about providing information about China’s ratification of the treaties, with at least one government website containing information on each treaty.

HRIC Treaty Body Recommendations

- Revise and clarify rules and procedures to require states to broadly disseminate information—produced by the UN and domestically—about treaties and treaty body reviews, as well as technical information on civil society participation in the treaty body review process, on websites of all relevant government ministries and subnational government departments and agencies, in the national language.

- Revise and clarify rules and procedures to strengthen reporting guidelines to require concrete information on dissemination efforts and quantitative and qualitative indicators of the reach and impact of the dissemination efforts. Include public education initiatives in cooperation with civil society at local and national levels to provide practical assistance to civil society on how to participate in the treaty body review process.

- Although each expert committee may need to address specific concerns presented by the relevant treaty, the treaty body chairs or an experts-led process should consider harmonizing and strengthening the treaty body rules regarding reporting guidelines and specific information on dissemination of information and outcomes.

- Continue the current good practice of webcasting the expert committee interactive dialogue with the state party delegations in the language of the state party under review. In addition, the OHCHR should conduct further follow-up to assess the availability of reliable domestic Internet access to the video, both the live and archived sessions, and perhaps developing a local language survey to assess knowledge of and participation in reviews, and technical access to the webcasts.

- Treaty body committee chairs should take on this task, supported by the OHCHR Secretariat, as they are in the best position to assess the rules and then to fashion, strengthen, and implement them. The goal should be to encourage diversity and effectiveness of civil society participation.

Conclusion

Empowering civil society at the international level has the potential to widen civil society space at all levels, including for all regimes that have restricted civil society space within their borders. Multilateral rules and procedures must take into account the challenges faced by a civil society in China of over 1.3 billion people, including retaliation against defenders and restriction of participation to officially approved NGOs. The efficacy and principled integrity of these rules and procedures will impact on the safe and enabling civil society space throughout the UN human rights bodies, and not only for Chinese civil society. As the High Commissioner has emphasized, civil society plays a crucial role in the effective
functioning of the whole UN human rights system, and that its participation “enriches the system’s responses by linking them to what is happening at the country level.” The system must be informed by a full and robust reporting from the ground, not only by vetted and official civil society participation.

Appendix: Treaty Body Rules for Civil Society Participation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Treaty Body</th>
<th>Input into LOIs/ LOIPRs</th>
<th>Parallel reports</th>
<th>Meetings with experts</th>
<th>Follow-up</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAT²²</td>
<td>Submit electronically, approximately three months before the session and publicly posted on the committee’s website.</td>
<td>Submit no later than four weeks before the opening of the session</td>
<td>• Those having submitted written information may meet with the Committee prior to the State party’s dialogue. • Formal private one-hour meetings with interpretation.</td>
<td>May submit information to the Committee for the follow-up procedure</td>
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<td>CEDAW²³</td>
<td>Electronically submit written information, not exceeding 3,300 words, several weeks prior to the pre-sessional working group</td>
<td>Submit written statements, not exceeding 3,300 words, three weeks prior to the session</td>
<td>• Private briefings • Informal and public meetings with ten minutes allocated for all NGOs intervening per country • NGOs may organize thematic briefings or side events</td>
<td>Information on follow-up and general recommendations are accepted</td>
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<td>CERD²⁴</td>
<td>Submit four to six weeks prior to the pre-sessional working group</td>
<td>Submit two weeks in advance of the session</td>
<td>• NGOs may participate in informal sessions with CERD where interpretation is provided in English, French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese. • Informal lunchtime briefings with CERD may also be arranged with prior notice.</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESCR²⁵</td>
<td>NGOs in consultative status may submit written statements</td>
<td>Submit 3-6 weeks in advance of the session</td>
<td>NGOs that have submitted written reports may participate in informal meetings and lunchtime briefings, and may request to intervene in the session</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC²⁶</td>
<td>• Submit two months prior to the beginning of the pre-sessional working group, and may request confidentiality. • Committee may invite selected NGOs to participate in pre-sessional working groups.</td>
<td>Submit several months in advance of the session, including parallel reports, comments on LOIs, written replies, and other relevant information</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
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<td>CRPD²⁷</td>
<td>• Submit three weeks before the adoption of the list of issues, or after the state party has submitted its replies to the list of issues. • For the simplified reporting procedure, written submissions are accepted four months before the Committee adopts the LOI.</td>
<td>Written submissions are accepted both before and after the state party submits its report</td>
<td>• NGOs may be invited to make oral statements • NGOs may apply to make briefings • Oral presentations may be made remotely, so long as four weeks’ notice has been given.</td>
<td>NGOs are encouraged to provide follow-up information to the Committee</td>
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2 Ibid., 18.
4 We searched the OHCHR website on September 29, 2017 and did not receive results for the guidelines in Chinese. However, the OHCHR’s publication, A Practical Guide for Civil Society: Universal Periodic Review, is available in Chinese at the following URL: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/UPR/PracticalGuideCivilSociety_ch.pdf.
8 Although the submissions website lists twelve joint submissions, according to the OHCHR report on stakeholder submissions, fifteen joint submissions were received. See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/17/CHN/3 (July 30, 2013) at 13-14.
9 One submission, ITN, represents a coalition of 185 member groups of the International Tibet Network. Other large joint submissions were received, but most represent coalitions of two to four organizations. Ibid.
10 Organizations were classified by location (international or domestic) and domestic organizations were further subcategorized based upon type (academic, CSO) and extent of government control. Hong Kong CSOs were broken out separately to reflect the normatively greater civil society space under the One Country Two Systems policy.
15 Although China has signed, but not yet ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1998), we note that the ICCPR does apply to the Hong Kong SAR, under the provisions of the Basic Law governing the Hong Kong SAR.
16 CAT, CESCIR, CRC, and CRPD have posted guidelines for CSO participation in Chinese. CEDAW and CERD have not.
17 We note that in some cases not all CSO submissions appear to have been uploaded to the OHCHR website, including reports that HRIC submitted.
19 Since 1983, China has submitted 26 State party reports for review under the six treaties it has ratified. Twenty-three of those reports have been uploaded to the OHCHR website, with seven of them mentioning state consultation with CSOs in the preparation of the report. Of those seven reports, only four list the CSOs that were consulted, and in most cases—including CESCR, CEDAW, and CRC state reports—these consultations were primarily with GONGOs. China had limited consultation with CSOs for its CAT and CERD reviews. China mentioned civil society consultation for its first CRPD review, but did not list the CSOs consulted.
20 Ministries, departments and organizations surveyed: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (外交部), Ministry of Justice (司法部), Ministry of Public Security (公安部), Supreme People’s Procuratorate (最高人民检察院), All China Lawyers Association (全国律协), The State Council Information Office (国务院新闻办公室), All China Women’s Federation (全国妇联), National Health and Family Planning Commission (国家卫生和计划生育委员会), National Working Committee of Children and Women under State Council (国务院妇女儿童工作委员会), All-China Federation of Trade Unions (中华全国总工会), China Disabled Persons’ Federation (中国残疾人联合会), China Association of Science and Technology (中国科学技术协会), National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会), The National Development and Reform Commission (国家发展和改革委员会),
Ministry of Education (教育部), State Ethnic Affairs Commission (国家民族事务委员会), State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development (国务院扶贫开发领导小组办公室), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (人力资源和社会保障部), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学院).


